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Beyond Search Costs: The Linguistic and Trust 
Functions of Trademarks 
Ariel Katz* 
ABSTRACT 
Modern trademark scholarship and jurisprudence view trademark 
law as an institution aimed at improving the amount and quality of 
information available in the marketplace by reducing search costs. By 
providing a concise and unequivocal identifier of the particular source 
of particular goods, trademarks facilitate the exchange between buyers 
and sellers, and provide producers with an incentive to maintain their 
goods and services at defined and persistent qualities.  
Working within this paradigm, this Article highlights that 
reducing search costs and providing incentives to maintain quality are 
related yet distinct functions and shows that recognizing their distinct 
nature enriches our understanding of trademark law. The Article first 
develops a distinction between two functions of trademarks: a linguistic 
and a trust functions. Then, the Article demonstrates how the 
distinction provides a matrix for evaluating the normative strength of 
various trademark rules and doctrines. Under this matrix, rules that 
promote both functions would be considered normatively strong; rules 
that promote neither function would be normatively weak; and rules 
that promote one function but not the other would be normatively 
ambiguous, their strength depending on the results of a closer cost-
benefit analysis.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Modern trademark scholarship and jurisprudence view trademark 
law as an institution that improves the amount and quality of 
information available in the marketplace.1 Under this paradigm 
 
 1. See, e.g., Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 1844 (2007) (noting that “[i]t would be difficult to overstate the 
level of consensus among commentators that the goal of trademark law is—and always has 
been—to improve the quality of information in the marketplace and thereby reduce consumer 
search costs” but rejecting the view that this has always been the case); see also Barton Beebe, 
The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA L. REV. 621, 624 (2004) (claiming that 
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trademarks are socially beneficial because they reduce consumer 
search costs. “[B]y providing a concise and unequivocal identifier of 
the particular source of particular goods,”2 trademarks facilitate 
exchange between buyers and sellers, as well as provide producers an 
incentive to maintain their goods and services at defined and 
persistent qualities.3  
Working within this paradigm, this Article highlights that 
reducing search costs and providing incentives to maintain quality 
are related yet distinct functions that hitherto have been lumped 
together by most commentators. The Article shows, however, that 
recognizing their distinct nature enriches our understanding of 
trademark law and provides a better framework for evaluating the 
normative strength of various trademark rules and doctrines, 
especially when trademark law expands into new domains. The 
Article first develops the distinction between the two functions, 
which will be referred to as the linguistic and the trust functions of 
trademarks, and then demonstrates how this distinction assists in 
evaluating various trademark rules and doctrines. Thus, the Article 
offers a matrix for evaluating the normative strength of various 
trademark rules and doctrines. Under this matrix, rules that promote 
both functions would be considered normatively strong; rules that 
promote neither function would be normatively weak; and rules that 
promote one function but not the other would be normatively 
ambiguous, and their strength would depend on the results of a 
closer cost-benefit analysis.  
Part II presents the distinction between the two functions by 
providing an information-based account of trademarks and their 
legal protection. Part III further explores the ways in which the two 
functions are related but distinct. The Article then evaluates several 
trademark rules in light of this distinction. Part IV demonstrates a 
 
the influence of this paradigm “is now nearly total . . . . No alternative account of trademark 
doctrine currently exists”). 
 2. Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 510 (7th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 971 
(2003). 
 3. See, e.g., Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163 (1995); Bretford 
Mfg., Inc. v. Smith Sys. Mfg. Co., 419 F.3d 576, 579 (7th Cir. 2005); Ty Inc., 306 F.3d at 
510; 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 
2:5 (4th ed. 2010); WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (2003); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, 
Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on the Internet, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 777 (2004).  
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case of normative strength. It shows how passing-off, the classic form 
of trademark infringement, interferes with both the linguistic and 
trust functions and how its prohibition promotes them. Part V 
demonstrates a case of normative weakness: it shows why invoking 
trademark law to limit comparative advertising promotes neither 
function, and may actually work against the market facilitating 
purposes of trademark law. Parts VI and VII each deal with 
normative ambiguity: rules that promote one function but not the 
other. This category will include examples such as dilution, initial 
interest confusion, and misrepresentation of one’s own products. It 
will be shown that while the normative strength of such rules 
depends on the results of a closer cost-benefit analysis, only rarely 
will such analysis support a finding of infringement. 
II. AN INFORMATION-BASED THEORY OF TRADEMARKS 
In 1987, William Landes and Richard Posner presented an 
influential “search costs” theory of trademark laws.4 They explained 
that trademarks are socially valuable because they reduce consumers’ 
search costs by allowing both sellers and buyers to economize on a 
trademark’s ability to encapsulate complex information and 
communicative value in condensed terms. So, for example, when 
ordering coffee in a restaurant or a grocery store, instead of asking 
for “the decaffeinated coffee made by General Foods,” a consumer 
with a specific preference for this type of coffee can simply ask for 
 
 4. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 
30 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1987). Although Landes and Posner made what is perhaps the most 
influential presentation of search cost theory, they were not the first to recognize that 
trademark laws reduce the costs incurred by consumers in searching for information about 
brands; see, e.g., Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423, 1429 (7th Cir. 1985) 
(“Trademarks help consumers to select goods. By identifying the source of the goods, they 
convey valuable information to consumers at lower costs. Easily identified trademarks reduce 
the costs consumers incur in searching for what they desire . . . .”); ARMEN ALCHIAN & 
WILLIAM R. ALLEN, EXCHANGE AND PRODUCTION: COMPETITION, COORDINATION, AND 
CONTROL 294 (2d ed. 1977) (“A powerful reducer of the costs of information about the 
qualities of products is the brand name.”); Peter E. Mims, Promotional Goods and the 
Functionality Doctrine: An Economic Model of Trademarks, 63 TEX. L. REV. 639, 658 n.102 
(1984) (“Trademarks can lower the costs of search in several ways. Most obviously, they assist 
consumers in distinguishing between different sellers and their prices.”); see also W.T. Rogers 
Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 338 (7th Cir. 1985) (“The purpose [of trademarks] is to reduce 
the cost of information to consumers by making it easy for them to identify the products or 
producers with which they have had either good experiences . . . or bad experiences . . . .”). 
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“Sanka.”5 Obviously, in order for trademarks or brand names to 
perform this economizing function, they must not be duplicated by 
others,6 at least not in the same market.7 Therefore, trademarks 
benefit consumers by simplifying their decision-making.8  
The search costs theory identifies another benefit arising from 
this search economizing function of trademarks: exclusive rights in 
trademarks create incentives for firms to produce goods and services 
with consistent and desirable qualities.9 Even if these qualities are not 
observable before buying, a consumer who has a positive experience 
with a product might be interested in purchasing it again and might 
recommend the product to others.10 Therefore, a producer interested 
in generating repeat sales would be interested in maintaining 
persistent quality, and an exclusive right in the mark allows him to 
distinguish himself and his products from those of other sellers, thus 
reassuring the consumer that she will get the features she desires 
every time she buys the product.11  
In sum, the search costs theory identifies two primary benefits of 
trademark protection. First, trademarks “reduce consumer search 
costs by providing a concise and unequivocal identifier of the 
particular source of particular goods,”12 thus facilitating the exchange 
between buyers and sellers. Second, trademarks also provide 
producers an incentive to maintain their goods and services at 
defined and persistent qualities, which in turn further reduces search 
costs by allowing consumers to rely on the trademarks as mental 
shortcuts when making purchasing decisions.  
 
 5. Landes & Posner, supra note 4, at 268–69. 
 6. Id. at 269. 
 7. Trademark doctrine has been quite willing to expand this rationale to enjoin junior 
uses of a mark in other markets when the junior use might result in confusion as to 
sponsorship or affiliation. This expansion, however, has been seriously questioned recently by 
Lemley & McKenna. See Mark A. Lemley & Mark McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, 62 STAN. 
L. REV. 413 (2010). 
 8. Nicholas Economides, Trademarks, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF 
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 602 (Peter Newman ed., 1998). 
 9. Id. 
 10. Generally, the analysis of this Article will apply equally to goods and services, and I 
will often use the term “product” to denote both. 
 11. Economides, supra note 8, at 602. 
 12. Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 510 (7th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 971 
(2003). 
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While the benefits from reducing search costs are quite 
straightforward, in the sense that ceteris paribus, simplicity is 
preferable over complexity, and lower costs are preferable to higher, 
the arguments developed later in this Article will benefit from greater 
elaboration of the second benefit of trademark protection, the 
incentive to provide quality. The incentive to provide quality, while 
sometimes implied in the conventional economic analysis of 
trademarks, deserves greater prominence because it serves a broader 
purpose than merely reducing search costs. As will be explained 
below, trademarks not only make a product market more efficient, in 
some cases they may be essential for the market’s very existence. 
Recognizing this broader benefit provides a richer information-based 
theory of trademarks as devices that improve the signals available to 
market participants and maintain such signals’ integrity. Recognizing 
that the incentive to produce quality is distinct from the mere 
reduction of search costs carries important implications for trademark 
doctrine. Some of these implications will be explored below.  
To appreciate the importance of these signals, consider a simple 
commodity like table salt. For most consumers, all salt is equally 
salty, and as long as the consumer can reliably identify the white 
crystals as salt, the identity of the manufacturer or the exact brand 
chosen makes very little difference. The product itself, once 
identified, conveys most of the information that the buyer needs 
when deciding whether to buy it or not. This commodified salt 
represents an example of what economists call a “search good”—a 
product whose characteristics are observable to consumers before 
buying.13 The characteristics of most goods and services, however, or 
at least some attributes of them, are not observable to consumers 
prior to purchasing them.14 In the case of some goods and services, 
while not observable before purchase, quality can be determined 
 
 13. Michael R. Darby & Edi Karni, Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud, 
16 J.L. & ECON. 67, 68 (1973). 
 14. Indeed, even simple salt is not truly a search good because it may bear some 
important attributes unknown to consumers. For example, even if the consumer identifies the 
crystals as table salt, she can only appreciate what saltiness is after experiencing it. Second, it 
would be next to impossible for a consumer to know how pure the salt is, what additives it may 
include, and how safe they are. This may explain why we do observe branded salt after all. 
Moreover, the growing availability of “gourmet salts” suggests that not all salts look and taste 
the same and that at least some consumers appreciate these differences.  
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after consumption. Economists call these “experience goods.”15 In 
the case of others, quality cannot be determined even after 
consumption, because such determination is prohibitively costly for 
most consumers. Economists call this class of goods “credence 
goods.”16 A newspaper may be an example of an experience good, 
whereas a pharmaceutical may be an example of a credence good.17  
Although economists use the terms search, experience, and 
credence goods, it is more correct to refer to attributes, as most goods 
or services may have different attributes that correspond to this 
classification.18 For example, the fact that a can of tuna looks like a 
can of tuna is a search attribute. The fact that the content tastes like 
tuna is an experience attribute. Whether the content is indeed tuna 
and not a good imitation, or whether it is safe for consumption, are 
credence attributes. Additional credence attributes may include 
whether the product contains genetically modified organisms, 
whether it was derived from organic farming, the age and working 
conditions of the work force, the environmental impact of the 
production process, compliance with animal welfare standards, 
nutritional properties, the geographical origin of the product, etc.—
all of which may be important to some consumers.19 
When various attributes of goods that consumers care about are 
known to the sellers but cannot be observed or verified by 
consumers, sellers have an incentive to mischaracterize their goods as 
carrying such attributes. Consumers, aware of this incentive and of 
their inability to distinguish between honest and dishonest sellers, 
respond by discounting the quality claims made by all sellers. They 
adjust downward the price that they are willing to pay to reflect the 
expected lower average quality. Honest sellers of higher quality 
goods who cannot credibly distinguish themselves as such cannot 
command a price that is commensurate with the presumed higher 
cost of supplying and maintaining higher quality and as a result 
might exit the market (or be prevented from entering in the first 
place). Upon their exit, the average quality decreases and so does the 
 
 15. Darby & Karni, supra note 13, at 68. 
 16. Id. at 68–69.  
 17. See Ariel Katz, Pharmaceutical Lemons: Innovation and Regulation in the Drug 
Industry, 14 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 1, 13 (2007). 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
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price consumers are willing to pay. As a result, it becomes 
unprofitable for the providers of the next quality tier to stay in the 
market. Eventually, the market may disappear altogether, or at least 
settle on a low-quality equilibrium. This result, first identified by 
George Akerlof, has since been known as “the market for lemons.”20 
Trademark law plays an important role in addressing this 
potential market failure. In the case of experience goods, sellers 
interested in generating repeat sales will have an incentive to supply 
and maintain the quality that they promise. Trademark law assists 
them in reducing search costs and preventing other competitors 
from passing themselves off as the honest ones, as described above. 
Repeat sales alone may not solve the problem with respect to 
credence goods or credence attributes, since these, by definition, 
cannot be verified by every individual consumer. However, 
trademarks also play some role in mitigating this concern.21 Over 
time, and if the consumer base of the product is large enough, a 
firm’s claim about its product’s credence qualities may eventually be 
verified (or at least not disproved). Thus, the firm’s sunk investment 
in building and maintaining its brand—investment which trademark 
law helps to assure—means that the firm will lose if it fails to deliver 
on its promises about quality.  
Moreover, trademark law plays an additional role in these 
circumstances. For example, certification marks allow consumers to 
rely on quality assurances supplied by third parties (e.g., Fair Trade 
labels). Geographical indications perform a similar function. Other 
trademark rules, such as the prohibition in section 43(a) of the 
Lanham Act22 of dealing with false designations of origin and false 
description or representation, further provide some assurances that 
the signals conveyed by sellers are reliable. All of this suggests that 
trademark law is important in a more fundamental way than merely 
reducing search costs. In the not infrequent cases where the 
information available to sellers and consumers about various 
attributes of goods and services is asymmetric, trademark law may be 
 
 20. George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and Market 
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970). 
 21. Trademarks’ anti-lemonization role should not be overstated. They play an 
important role, but this role is certainly neither perfect nor exclusive. For a discussion of 
various anti-lemonization mechanisms and their shortcomings, see Katz, supra note 17, at 19–
33. 
 22. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006). 
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essential for markets to exist. In other words, trademarks may 
contribute to market efficiency not only by reducing transaction 
costs, but by assuring the very existence of these markets.  
To summarize, trademarks perform two main functions that are 
related yet distinct: they reduce search costs by condensing complex 
meanings into concise and unequivocal terms, and they allow buyers 
to trust and rely upon the signals conveyed by sellers as guarantees 
for quality, thus helping to prevent the lemonization of markets for 
goods with experience and credence attributes.23 Let us call the first 
function the linguistic function of trademarks and the second the 
trust function of trademarks.24 I choose the term “linguistic 
function” to highlight the point that trademarks’ capacity to denote 
complex meanings is similar to the capacity of any word, term or 
name to denote complex meanings and to highlight the point that 
trademarks, once used in association with products, enter our 
communicative vocabulary.25 I choose the term “trust function” to 
highlight trademarks’ capacity to denote unobservable experience 
and credence attributes, thus allowing consumers to trust specific 
sellers or products. The latter depends on the former: being able to 
trust that the seller provides or the product has the desired but 
unobservable attributes, the consumer must be able to reliably 
distinguish between different sellers or products.  
 
 23. Trademarks’ capacity to address the problems arising from information asymmetry 
and the existence of credence attributes should not be mistaken to suggest that trademarks 
alone can always solve such problems. As I have argued elsewhere, there are instances in which 
relying exclusively on market mechanisms to solve such problems may not be enough and 
quality regulation may be desirable. See Katz, supra note 17, at 7. Even when specific quality 
regulation is not necessary, trademarks work in tandem with other legal and other mechanisms, 
such as contract and tort law and consumer protection laws, to address such issues.  
 24. Shahar Dillbary emphasized a similar distinction between two types of information 
that trademarks convey. As he notes, “[a] trademark conveys primarily two types of 
information about the product to which it is attached, which serve two different functions. 
First, a trademark conveys information about the source of sale or manufacture. Such 
information enables the consumer to choose the product she wants from a set of products by 
reducing her inter-brand search cost. . . . Second, a trademark may convey information about 
the product itself. A descriptive mark, for example, informs the consumer about a certain 
quality or characteristic of the product.” J. Shahar Dillbary, Getting the Word Out: The 
Informational Function of Trademark, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 991, 1023–24 (2009) [hereinafter 
Getting the Word Out] (emphasis added). He refers to the first function as inter-brand function 
and to the second as intra-brand. Id. at 993–94. 
 25. Like other vocabulary elements, trademarks’ meanings are not static, and over time 
they may evolve to denote different meanings. See infra Part III. 
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The hallmark of trademark law, therefore, is its twofold capacity 
to improve the quality of information available to market 
participants. It allows sellers to deliver simplified signals, thus 
improving the efficiency of signal communication, and it maintains 
the integrity of the signals, thus allowing buyers to trust these signals 
when they convey information regarding experience or credence 
attributes of goods. 
Before I proceed, I would like to clarify a certain ambiguity. The 
theory of trademarks just described implies that trademarks signal 
products’ physical attributes, or at least attributes that can be 
objectively determined. It also assumed that consumers’ preferences 
are fixed and that trademarks help satisfy these preferences by 
informing consumers about product attributes, thus simplifying the 
matching between the consumer preferences and the set of objective 
attributes she desires. But, as anyone who has lived in a consumer 
society will know, assuming that these are the extent of a trademark’s 
function is naïve.26  
Trademarks and their legal protection allow manufacturers not 
only to satisfy existing preferences but also create and shape them. 
Persuasive branding, through advertising and other promotional 
measures, attempts to create an image for the product, a new cultural 
or psychological meaning, which extends beyond the product’s 
physical attributes.27 A person buying a Cartier watch buys it not just 
to satisfy his preference for a time-showing instrument or to satisfy a 
particular aesthetic preference. Buying a Cartier watch might also (or 
even primarily) satisfy a desire to signal to others one’s wealth or 
style, or it might provide the buyer some psychological pleasure 
associated with the trademark’s fame, which has been largely created 
through persuasive branding.28 Whether this phenomenon is efficient 
or socially desirable is beyond the scope of this Article. For the 
purposes of this Article, it is enough to note that such advertising-
induced preferences exist, and that once the consumer believes that 
 
 26. Shahar J. Dillbary, Famous Trademarks and the Rational Basis for Protecting 
“Irrational Beliefs,” 14 GEO. MASON. L. REV. 605, 620 (2007) [hereinafter Famous 
Trademarks].  
 27. Id.  
 28. Id. at 622–25. See also Deven R. Desai & Spencer Waller, Brands, Competition, and 
the Law, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1425, 1427 (“Brands allow businesses to reach consumers directly 
with messages regarding emotion, identity, and self-worth such that consumers are no longer 
buying a product but buying a brand.”). 
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the product possesses the advertised qualities, the trademark’s 
linguistic and trust function work as if those were physical or 
otherwise objectively determinable attributes.  
The trademark Cartier helps the consumer efficiently to 
distinguish a Cartier watch from a Rolex or a Casio watch—the 
linguistic functions—and it allows the consumer to rely on the 
trademark as an indicator of whatever unobservable attributes she 
believes the watch possesses—the trust function. The consumer 
might be interested in a Cartier because it has gained reputation for a 
certain level of mechanical workmanship or because it has gained 
reputation for style—or both. These preferences can only be satisfied 
if the consumer can be assured that the particular watch he 
contemplates buying is indeed a genuine Cartier.  
But just as trademark law can contribute to the efficiency of 
competitive markets by improving the quality of information signals, 
trademark law can go awry. Misguided trademark law can interfere 
with and distort the information available to consumers and prevent 
them from making informed decisions. When this happens, 
trademark law may unfortunately make the market less, rather than 
more, efficient. Recognizing the twofold capacity of trademarks to 
enhance market efficiency can provide a more nuanced gauge to 
evaluate the normative strength of various rules and doctrines of 
trademark law. The rest of this Article will provide such a normative 
account. This Article will explore various rules and examine the 
extent to which they advance, are neutral toward, or hinder the two 
functions. I will argue that rules that enhance both functions are 
normatively-strong, whereas rules that stand in the way of one or 
both functions would be normatively-weak. Rules that promote one 
function but are neutral with respect to the other would be 
normatively-ambiguous and would often require trading-off the 
benefits of trademark protection against other legitimate interests 
such as free competition, free speech, and other interests that liberal 
societies cherish. But before doing that, let me elaborate a little 
further on the linguistic and trust functions of trademarks and the 
ways in which these functions are related but distinct.  
III. RELATED BUT DISTINCT FUNCTIONS 
The linguistic and trust functions of trademarks are inherently 
related yet distinct. The linguistic function enables the product to be 
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distinguished from other products, and in this regard the trademark 
functions like an individual’s name. We may ask, “who is this 
person?” and we may get the person’s name in response. If we are 
interested in an easy way to refer to this person, then the person’s 
name is a satisfactory answer. The person’s name allows us to easily 
address or refer to this person while distinguishing him from all 
other people who have different names. The name’s utility lies in its 
ability to distinguish between people. It is true that we can 
distinguish even without names, but names allow us to distinguish 
more efficiently. To paraphrase an example by Landes and Posner,29 
even in the absence of names, one may still be able to distinguish 
between a certain colleague of mine and myself despite the fact that 
both of us are young intellectual property scholars from the 
University of Toronto, that both of us are Jewish, wear glasses, and 
that both of us have foreign accents. Even without names, one may 
distinguish between us by pointing to the fact that my colleague 
speaks English with a Latin-American accent whereas mine is Israeli, 
or by referring to my colleague as a “Nietzsche-loving-well-
groomed-Latino,” as one student once wrote, and for which I will 
certainly not be mistaken. But evidently, referring to my colleague as 
Abraham Drassinower and to me as Ariel Katz is much more 
efficient.30  
However, the question “who is this person” may pertain to 
something else beyond the name. It may mean “who really is this 
person? Who is the person behind the name, what does she stand 
for?” In this case, the name’s function is not limited to an inter-
personal distinction, but is rather intra-personal. The name helps to 
connect the person to a set of attributes that she possesses.31 These 
attributes may be complex, they often are not easily identifiable, and 
the name helps in conjuring them up and communicating them to 
others once they have been learned. For some purposes, the first 
function of the name may be sufficient, but for most other social 
interactions, the second function is more important. Effective means 
 
 29. Landes & Posner, supra note 4, at 269. 
 30. Id. (“The benefit of the brand name is analogous to that of designating individuals 
by last as well as first names, so that, instead of having to say ‘the Geoffrey who teaches 
constitutional law at the University of Chicago Law School—not the one who teaches 
corporations,’ you can say ‘Geoffrey Stone—not Geoffrey Miller.’”). 
 31. Cf. Beebe, supra note 1, at 623–24 . 
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for distinguishing between individuals are valuable mainly because 
individuals are different from each other. In a society of clones, 
distinguishing between individuals is unnecessary because the 
interaction with each of them will be identical. Any attempt to 
distinguish between clones will involve some cost without any 
corresponding benefit. Exceptions to this rule may exist. Recall Dr. 
Seuss’s story about the unfortunate Mrs. McCave who “had twenty-
three sons and she named them all Dave.” Indeed, “that wasn’t a 
smart thing to do” because “when she wants one, and calls out ‘Yoo-
Hoo! Come into the house, Dave!’ she doesn’t get one. All twenty-
three Daves of hers come on the run!”32 If Mrs. McCave was 
interested in calling only a son (but no one in particular) and gave 
her sons different names, then the first inter-personal distinguishing 
function of the names would be sufficient. She could randomly call 
out one name, and only son would come on the run instead of 
twenty-three. However, if Mrs. McCave had some reason to interact 
with a particular son and not the others, as will often be the case, 
then the intra-personal function of the name comes into action. 
The same is true with products. Trademark discourse often 
speaks of trademarks as indicators of source or origin, so that if, for 
example, someone is interested in distinguishing between a black 
carbonated soft drink manufactured by a company from Atlanta, GA, 
and a black carbonated soft drink manufactured by a company from 
Purchase, NY, she can more efficiently do so by referring to the one 
as Coca-Cola and to the other as Pepsi. In such cases the trademark 
facilitates inter-brand distinction. But often, distinguishing between 
the two brands is not important merely for the sake of knowing who 
manufactures the product, but is important because the trademark 
serves an intra-brand function. The trademark indicates a set of 
complex attributes, not easily observable, that the consumer may 
care about and believe to exist in one product but not in the other. 
In most cases, distinguishing between brands is important only 
because, and only when, consumers perceive differences between 
them.  
Like names, trademarks’ linguistic function provides efficient 
means to distinguish between brands. And like names, this really 
matters because of trademarks’ trust function: their ability to stand 
 
 32. THEODORE SEUSS GEISEL, THE SNEETCHES AND OTHER STORIES (Random House 
1961). I thank Chris Yoo for reminding me of Mrs. McCave. 
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for complex sets of unobservable attributes. The two functions are 
related. The ability to condense complex meanings into short, 
memorizable terms facilitates the communication of such otherwise 
unobservable meanings and thus makes it easier for people to rely on 
them. If the cost of distinguishing between two brands increases 
beyond a certain level, the brands may become effectively 
indistinguishable, and indistinguishable brands cannot be relied 
upon for fulfilling their respective trust functions. However, this is 
true only beyond a certain level of search costs. Below that level, 
concurrent use of the same identifier, while increasing the cost of 
distinguishing between the brands, will not frustrate the trust 
function. For example, Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola can both name 
their beverage a Cola, and this presents a very small problem because 
the producers and the products can easily be distinguished by adding 
another descriptor to the term: Coca and Pepsi, respectively. Assume 
a vendor asked a consumer who prefers Coca-Cola over Pepsi-Cola 
the following question: “would you like to drink cola?” The 
consumer may respond asking: “which cola do you have?” and the 
vendor may reply “I have Coca-Cola.” Because Coca-Cola does not 
have an exclusive right over the term “cola,” this interaction entails a 
slightly higher search cost than that incurred if the term cola was 
exclusive to Coca-Cola. However, despite the higher search cost, the 
trust function has not been impaired at all. Once this higher search 
cost has been incurred, the consumer can easily attribute the desired 
qualities to her preferred brand.33 In theory, the same thing can 
happen even if both producers were allowed to name their products 
Coca-Cola. The vendor may ask “would you like to drink Coca-
Cola?” and the consumer may respond asking “which Coca-Cola?” 
The vendor then would say: “the Coca-Cola made by the company 
from Atlanta, GA.” As in the previous example, we have an increase 
in search costs, but not necessarily an impairment of the trust 
function. This situation may create a trust problem only if the 
additional information is not sufficient to render the two products 
distinguishable, or, in trademark lingo, to prevent source confusion. 
 
 33. In this example, using the same identifier increases the cost of distinguishing 
between the two brands, but at the same time it can decrease the cost of distinguishing 
between the type of products. Using the term “cola” makes it easier to differentiate colas from 
other beverages, such as juices. This is one of the reasons why no one seller can have an 
exclusive right to use the term “cola” to describe cola. 
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But theoretically this can be remedied by adding more information 
(“the Coca-Cola made by the company from Atlanta, GA, whose 
cans are red, which has nothing to do with the Coca-Cola made by 
the company from Purchase, NY, whose cans are blue”).  
We would probably reject this theoretical solution because we 
can assume that beyond a certain point additional information has a 
decreasing marginal capacity to clarify the confusion (“I don’t really 
know where the Coca-Cola with the taste that I like is made and I 
don’t recall if it comes in red or blue can, so the information doesn’t 
help me distinguishing between the two products, so I don’t know if 
the one that you have has the taste that I like”). Or it may be that 
additional information would clarify the confusion, but the cost of 
processing the information necessary to distinguish between the two 
brands will outweigh the benefit in buying the particular good. In 
such cases, the consumer might choose to forego the transaction 
altogether and opt for a second-best choice (“You know what? 
Forget about the Coca-Cola, I’ll take orange juice”). This would 
constitute not only a problem of higher search costs, but a trust 
problem. In this microcosm, the inability to distinguish between the 
two colas prevented the consumer from getting his first-best choice 
and made the cola market practically disappear.  
To sum up this point, trademarks’ two functions, the linguistic 
and the trust functions, are related yet distinct. The linguistic 
function, and its capacity to reduce search costs, is valuable because 
it improves the technology of communication, and, other things 
being equal, low-cost communication is preferable to higher-cost 
communication. But improving the technology of communication 
also facilitates the trust function because it helps communicating 
differences between products that otherwise are not easily observable 
to consumers. However, while the two functions are related, changes 
in the one do not necessarily lead to the same change in the other. 
Not every increase or decrease in search cost will lead to the same 
degree of increase or decrease in trust. While beyond a critical 
threshold, an impairment of the linguistic function through an 
increase in search costs will also impair the trust function, below this 
threshold, trademark could fulfill its trust function despite an 
increase in search costs.  
Let me turn now to demonstrate how recognizing trademarks’ 
distinct functions can be useful for evaluating various trademark 
rules. The next parts examine several rules and doctrines in 
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trademark law and evaluate their normative strength according to the 
degree to which they are compatible with the two functions, neither 
of them, or only one of them. 
IV. NORMATIVELY-ROBUST: RULES PROMOTING BOTH FUNCTIONS  
As an example of a normatively-robust rule, I will use the tort of 
passing off, the oldest and most classic form of trademark 
infringement, whereby one confusingly uses another’s mark to 
designate his own goods.34 Passing off frustrates both the linguistic 
and the trust function. For example, if I can start manufacturing a 
black carbonated soft drink and call it Coca-Cola, the mark Coca-
Cola will no longer be a simple unequivocal signifier of the product 
made by the Coca-Cola Company from Atlanta, GA. The Coca-Cola 
Company would have to provide more information in order to 
distinguish itself from me, and consumers interested in its products 
rather than mine would have to incur higher search costs. Therefore, 
my competing use of the mark frustrates its linguistic function by 
increasing consumers search costs, and the legal prohibition on this 
use of the mark promotes this function. 
But my competing use also frustrates the trust function. If both I 
and the company from Atlanta can sell the drink and call it Coca-
Cola, and consumers cannot tell us apart, and if some experience or 
credence qualities are important, and if providing them is costly, 
then, being unable to distinguish itself from me, the company from 
Atlanta, which provides these qualities, might find it no longer 
profitable to provide them. Hence, a lemons problem. Therefore, in 
addition to increasing search costs, allowing me to use the mark 
frustrates its trust function, and prohibiting me from using the mark 
promotes it.  
Note, though, that frustrating the trust function could be more 
harmful than frustrating the linguistic function. If I am allowed to 
call my product Coca-Cola, the consumer who is interested in the 
drink from Atlanta can still look for other clues, such as the 
manufacturing place, and the company from Atlanta could print on 
its cans: “The Original Coca-Cola made by the Coca-Cola Company 
of Atlanta.” Although adding this information might involve higher 
costs, if the information is meaningful and important to the 
 
 34. MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 5:2. 
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consumer, providing it will allow the consumer to get what she 
wants (unless these costs are prohibitive). The market is surely less 
efficient. More resources are now necessary for selling the same 
quantity, and if some consumers are not willing to incur such 
additional costs, lower quantity will be sold. However, as long as 
enough consumers are willing to incur these costs and thereby can 
distinguish between the products, the market still exists. 
In contrast, if I am allowed to pass myself off as the company 
from Atlanta, or to pass off any other distinguishing clue to the 
extent that consumers cannot tell us apart, then the market for the 
particular credence attributes may disappear altogether. Therefore, 
reducing search cost is no doubt beneficial, but preserving the trust 
function can be crucial. The prohibition on passing off serves both 
functions. The two work in tandem to promote market efficiency, 
with little effect, if any, on legitimate countervailing interests. As a 
result, the prohibition on passing off is a normatively robust rule. 
Because the prohibition on this oldest and most classic form of 
trademark infringement serves both functions simultaneously, it is no 
wonder that doctrine and theory have evolved without paying much 
attention to the fact that two distinct functions are being served.35  
V. NORMATIVELY-WEAK: RULES INCOMPATIBLE WITH ONE OR 
BOTH FUNCTIONS 
The previous Part discussed the prohibition on passing off, a rule 
that promotes trademarks’ two functions and therefore is 
normatively strong. This Part deals with rules that are incompatible 
with those functions and therefore would be normatively weak. 
Interestingly, I could not identify examples of any rules that hinder 
both functions, that is, rules that mandate an increase in search costs 
as well as hinder the trust function. This may not be that surprising 
after all, as such rules would not be very sustainable. However, I 
could identify a rule that does not have any effect on the trust 
 
 35. In fact, as McKenna observes, in its early days, trademark law was predominantly 
focused on producers’ interests whereas consumers’ interests or those of the public at large 
were regarded as secondary. See McKenna, supra note 1, at 1863–66. According to McKenna, 
it is not until the early to middle part of the twentieth century that courts began to focus on 
consumers’ interests. Id. at 1865–66. However, because trademark infringement and unfair 
competition cases traditionally involved instances of passing off by competitors, courts were 
likely to reach the same results in most of these cases regardless of whose interests they 
prioritized. Id. at 1866. 
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function while still mandating higher search costs. This happens 
when trademark law can be used to prevent truthful comparative 
advertising. Because comparative advertising often reduces search 
costs, invoking trademark law to prevent it is antithetical to one of 
the law’s purposes.  
In the United States, trademark law permits using a competitor’s 
trademark in comparative advertising, as long as the information 
provided is truthful and nonconfusing.36 This is not the case 
everywhere. In some jurisdictions, such as Canada37 and the 
European Union,38 using a competitor’s trademark in truthful and 
nonconfusing comparisons may nonetheless infringe the trademarks. 
I will show below that banning such comparative advertising serves 
neither the linguistic nor the trust function of trademarks. In fact, 
such ban increases consumer search costs, and may decrease market 
efficiency by increasing competitors’ costs to entry. Therefore, under 
the framework proposed in this Article, the normative basis for such 
a rule is quite weak.  
A. Clairol 
The partial ban on comparative advertising in Canada owes its 
origin to a 1965 case, Clairol Int’l Corp. v. Thomas Supply & 
Equipment Co.39 The legislative context in Clairol was Section 22(1) 
of the Trade-marks Act, which provides that “[n]o person shall use a 
trade-mark registered by another person in a manner that is likely to 
have the effect of depreciating the value of the goodwill attaching 
thereto.”40 This was the first time the provision had been considered 
at length, and Justice Thurlow, who struggled to provide meaning to 
the novel provision ultimately rendered a much criticized decision—
but a resilient one nonetheless.  
The plaintiffs, Clairol International and its Canadian subsidiary 
(collectively, “Clairol”) were respectively the owner and the 
 
 36. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 25:52. An exception to this rule is Deere & Co. v. 
MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1994), discussed in Part VII.  
 37. See infra Part V.A. 
 38. See Case C-487/07, L’Oréal SA v. Bellure NV ECJ CELEX LEXIS No. 
62007J0487 (June 18, 2009), http://curia.europa.eu; see also Dev Gangjee & Robert Burrell, 
Because You’re Worth It: L’Oreal and the Prohibition on Free Riding, 73 MOD. L. REV. 282 
(2010). 
 39. [1968] 2 Ex. C.R. 552 (Can.). 
 40. Trade-marks Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. T-13, s. 22. 
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registered user of the trademark “Miss Clairol,” registered for use in 
association with hair tinting and coloring compositions.41 The 
defendants (collectively, “Revlon”) were the suppliers in Canada of 
“Colorsilk,” a competing brand of hair color, manufactured by 
Revlon.42 During the period that preceded the litigation Clairol was 
the dominant player in this area, enjoying a 50% share of the market 
for hair coloring preparations in beauty salons and 70% of the market 
in drugstores, department and other retail stores.43 In June 1965 
Revlon began using color comparative charts printed in brochures 
that it circulated and on the packages of its Colorsilk products.44 One 
column of the chart bore the heading Revlon ‘Colorsilk’ Hair Color 
and listed names of color shades with numbers.45 The second column 
bore the heading Miss Clairol Hair Color Bath and presented the 
numbers used by Clairol to identify its own color shades.46 Other 
columns referred to other competing brands’ color shades.47 
Among its various complaints, Clairol maintained that Revlon’s 
use of its trademark, as printed in the charts, depreciated the value of 
its goodwill, contrary to Section 22(1).48 Justice Thurlow concluded 
that Revlon’s use of Clairol’s trademark was likely to depreciate the 
value of Clairol’s goodwill, but as a matter of statutory 
interpretation, only the use of the trademark on the packaging 
actually violated Section 22.49 The difference resulted from Justice 
Thurlow’s interpretation of the term “use,” which appears in Section 
22 and which Section 4 of the Act defines.50  According to Justice 
 
 41. See Clairol Int’l. Corp. v. Thomas Supply & Equip. Co., [1968] 2 Ex. C.R. 552, 
paras. 2–3 (Can.). 
 42. Id. at para. 3. 
 43. Id. at para. 8 (Text Book References).  
 44. Id. at paras. 5, 7. 
 45. Id. at para. 5. 
 46. Id. 
 47. See id. 
 48. Id. at para. 11. 
 49. See id. at paras. 38, 46–47. 
 50. Section 4 of the Trade-mark Act reads as follows:  
 (1) A trade-mark is deemed to be used in association with wares if, at the time 
of the transfer of the property in or possession of the wares, in the normal course of 
trade, it is marked on the wares themselves or on the packages in which they are 
distributed or it is in any other manner so associated with the wares that notice of 
the association is then given to the person to whom the property or possession is 
transferred.  
  (2) A trade-mark is deemed to be used in association with services if it is used 
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Thurlow, the correct statutory interpretation meant that, with 
respect to wares, a trademark is only deemed to be used if it appears 
on the wares or their packaging.51 This excluded the brochures from 
the ambit of Section 22 with respect to wares (although it would not 
exclude them had the brochures been used with respect to services, 
where Section 4 deems a trademark to be used in association with 
services if it is used or displayed in their performance or 
advertising).52 While many commentators have taken issue with this 
strange, highly formal and unprincipled distinction between 
packages, brochures, wares, and services, my main issue is with the 
proposition that truthful and non-confusing comparative advertising 
in general, and the kind in which Revlon had engaged in particular, 
could ever constitute actionable use of a trademark. As I shall set 
forth below, interpreting Section 22 to include such activities 
contradicts trademark law’s purpose to advance the information 
available to market participants, and therefore, rather than serving 
the operation of a competitive marketplace, such interpretation 
undermines it.  
To understand how such an interpretation of Section 22 
undermines the operation of a competitive marketplace, consider the 
nature of Clairol’s product, the functions Clairol’s trademark fulfilled 
with respect to it, and the purpose Revlon sought to achieve by 
including it in the comparison charts. By definition, people who care 
to take the effort of dyeing their hair are rather sensitive to its 
appearance, and we may assume that they would be concerned about 
sudden unexpected changes in its tone.53 Moreover, in its early days, 
Clairol, who pioneered the hair coloring business, faced a major 
marketing hurdle: although many women colored their hair, very few 
would admit it because it was considered vulgar.54 “You had to 
convince women that if you colored your hair, you weren’t a woman 
 
or displayed in the performance or advertising of those services.  
Trade-marks Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. T-13, s. 4. 
 51. Clairol, 2 Ex. C.R. at paras. 35, 45 (Textbook References). 
 52.  Trade-marks Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. T-13, 4. 
 53. See Clairol, Inc. v. Sarann Co., 37 Pa. D. & C.2d 433, 440 (1965) (“Permanent 
hair coloring is a high anxiety product, for women are apprehensive that using it will affect 
their status, reputation and appearance.”). 
 54. Terry Pristin, Joan Bove, Who Helped Found Clairol, Is Dead at 99, N.Y. TIMES, July 
23, 2001, at B6. 
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of the night.”55 Although much has changed in the way coloring 
one’s hair is presently perceived, I believe it is fair to assume that 
some people still retain this attitude today, and that many of them 
held it in 1965. Therefore, an unexpected change in one’s hair color 
could be a source of major embarrassment, or at least create some 
level of anxiety—a major concern for consumers.  
Economically speaking, many hair color users are risk-averse to 
unexpected changes in their hair color. Clearly, Clairol’s success 
stemmed not only from being the first to sell an easy to use and 
more natural looking product,56 but also from its ability to reassure 
its customers that they would look the same each time they dye their 
hair; they could keep coloring their hair without fearing that 
unexpected changes in color would reveal their secret. Using the 
previous terminology, hair color is a good with salient experience 
attributes, and trademarks play a crucial part in communicating these 
ex ante unobservable attributes to consumers. This suggests that 
Clairol would benefit from strong brand loyalty. It can also explain 
why Clairol had maintained a much higher market share in the retail 
segment compared to the hair beauty segment.57 Whereas in the 
retail segment consumers relied solely on the trademark for quality 
assurance, in the beauty salons they could partly rely on the 
assurances supplied by the hair dresser, a professional who might risk 
her own reputation by recommending another brand. Indeed, 
endorsement by hairdressers was perceived crucial for success in the 
retail segment.58  
The above analysis also suggests why it was important for Revlon 
to use the comparative charts if it wanted to compete effectively in 
this market. Clairol was the pioneer in this market and at the time of 
 
 55. Id. (quoting Joan Bove’s son, Richard L. Gelb). 
 56. Id. See also Malcolm Gladwell, Annals of Advertising: True Colors, THE NEW 
YORKER, Mar. 22, 1999, at 72 (“Miss Clairol gave American women the ability, for the first 
time, to color their hair quickly and easily at home.”). 
 57. Clairol, 2 Ex. C.R. at para. 8 (Textbook References). 
 58. In Clairol v. Sarann, 37 Pa. D. & C.2d 433 (1965), the court explained that 
Clairol, as well as its competitors, charged a “competitive” low price of $0.39 per bottle to 
hairdressers, and considerably higher prices $0.67–$0.71 to retailers. The court explained that 
“[t]his price differential exists because $.39 is a competitive price in the beauty professional 
trade, and plaintiff desires to meet its competition. It is necessary for plaintiff to do so, because 
it is important to success in the retail trade that plaintiff receive the endorsement of the 
professional hairdresser. Plaintiff’s competitors who sell in both channels of trade have similar 
price structures.” 
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the litigation had a 70% market share of the retail level and 50% 
market share of the beauty salon segment.59 Revlon was a newer 
player in this field. Like Clairol, Revlon had to overcome consumers’ 
reluctance to use hair color and to assure those who did that their 
hair would maintain a consistent look whenever they used its 
products. We may assume that Revlon, a well-known brand in itself 
in this field,60 could meet this challenge. But Revlon faced another 
challenge. Offering an equally good product at an equally attractive 
price might not suffice to contest Clairol’s dominance. Even offering 
a better quality/price combination might not suffice. Revlon could 
assure its customers a consistent look if they used its product, but in 
order to persuade them to switch from Clairol, it needed to provide 
an additional assurance: a consistent look when switching from 
Clairol to Revlon. Without the ability to make such a promise 
convincingly, risk-averse consumers would stay with Clairol, even if 
they were otherwise willing to switch.  
Therefore, Clairol’s advantage in the market stemmed not only 
from its own merits: its innovativeness, the quality of its product, and 
its business acumen, but also from lack of information available to its 
customers regarding its competitors’ equivalent products. Clairol 
could exploit its customers’ lack of information about the look of 
their hair should they decide to switch and rely on the resulting 
tendency of risk-averse consumers to stay with Clairol. As a result, 
Clairol could preserve its market share by taking advantage of 
incomplete information available to its customers. Revlon attempted 
to compete by completing this missing information. It printed a 
comparison chart, which told potential customers contemplating a 
switch from Clairol to Revlon which of Revlon’s tones they should 
choose in order to avoid any embarrassing change in the color of 
their hair.  
When the court determined that Revlon’s use of Clairol’s 
trademark on its packages depreciated Clairol’s goodwill and 
therefore entitled Clairol to relief,61 it interfered with Revlon’s ability 
to improve the amount of relevant and truthful information available 
to consumers and allowed Clairol to benefit from a barrier to 
competition based on missing information. Surely, there is nothing 
 
 59.  Clairol, 2 Ex. C.R. at para. 8. 
 60. Id. at para. 9. 
 61.  Id. at para. 46. 
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wrong when Clairol benefits from the ability of its brand to convey 
information that consumers deem important. But it does not follow 
that Clairol should be entitled to enjoin its competitors from 
conveying such information as well. The court’s interpretation of 
what constitutes unlawful depreciation of goodwill went beyond 
assuring Clairol’s ability to provide useful information to consumers. 
The court went further and handicapped the ability of its competitor 
to provide useful information as well.  
This stands in contrast to trademark law’s purpose of advancing 
and improving the information available to market participants. 
Neither the linguistic nor the trust function of Clairol’s trademarks 
was impaired by Revlon’s comparative charts, which, as far as we 
know, contained truthful information. Revlon’s charts did not impair 
consumers’ ability to trust the message conveyed by Clairol. 
Likewise, Revlon’s charts did not add the slightest search cost to 
Clairol’s most loyal customers. The charts’ effect was to reduce the 
search costs faced by Clairol’s customers who were willing to 
contemplate a switch. Therefore, Revlon’s acts were fully consistent 
with trademark law’s purposes, and prohibiting them caused 
trademark law to go awry.  
VI. NORMATIVE AMBIGUITY I: RULES PROMOTING THE 
LINGUISTIC FUNCTION BUT NOT THE TRUST FUNCTION 
The previous examples, passing off and comparative advertising 
were easy to resolve. The first example concerned a harmful practice 
that clearly impairs both functions of trademark law and a legal rule 
that justifiably prohibits it. The second example concerned a benign 
practice, which promotes one function (and irrelevant to the other), 
and a rule that unjustifiably prohibits it. In the sections below I 
describe some more difficult cases in which the practices complained 
about might slightly impair one function but not the other. This Part 
will analyze practices that may impair the linguistic function by 
increasing search costs, but have no effect on the trust function. I 
consider these cases normatively ambiguous because although mere 
increase in search costs may seem sufficient to warrant legal 
intervention, often other interests such as free competition or free 
speech will be at stake. Frequently, there will be some legitimate 
reasons why the junior user may seek to use the mark. In such cases 
determining whether this use should be allowed or enjoined will 
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require some tradeoffs which do not exist in the case of classic 
passing off, for example. In such cases the mere fact that the practice 
may increase search costs should not suffice for rendering the 
behavior unlawful. As the analysis below will demonstrate, such uses 
of a mark should only be enjoined if the increase in search costs is 
not compensated for by other greater social benefits. My analysis will 
focus on dilution by blurring and initial interest confusion.  
A. Dilution by Blurring 
Frank Schechter believed that trademarks should be protected 
not only against uses which create consumer confusion, but also 
against uses which cause “the gradual whittling away or dispersion of 
the identity and hold upon the public mind of the mark or name by 
its use upon non-competing goods.”62 However, the theoretical 
underpinning for the anti-dilution remedy in the United States has 
been highly contested. Commentators have criticized the degree to 
which such a remedy is consistent with consumers’ interests and its 
general fit within trademark law’s market-oriented general scheme.63 
Nevertheless, search costs theory has been applied in justifying 
dilution law in a way that is supposedly consistent with trademark 
law’s overarching pro-consumer approach.64 For example, as Brian 
Jacobs argues, anti-dilution law might be used to prevent the 
inefficiency that could occur when a junior user adopts a famous 
trademark without providing sufficient distinguishing characteristics, 
 
 62. Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 
813, 825 (1927). 
 63. See, e.g., Robert N. Klieger, Trademark Dilution: The Whittling Away of the 
Rational Basis for Trademark Protection, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 789, 795 (1997) (“[T]he 
trademark rights in gross to which dilution protection gives rise pose an anticompetitive threat 
to market efficiency and consumer welfare.”); David S. Welkowitz, Reexamining Trademark 
Dilution, 44 VAND. L. REV. 531, 584 (1991) (“[S]ociety’s return for granting this proprietary 
interest is uncertain at best . . . . [trademarks] can create artificial barriers to entry . . . by 
fostering brand loyalty at the expense of thoughtful decision making.”). 
 64. See, e.g., Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, A Search-Costs Theory of Limiting 
Doctrines in Trademark Law, 97 TRADEMARK REP. 1223, 1229 (2007) (“[T]he [anti-
dilution] statute focuses on uses that increase consumer search costs . . . and [] permit[s] uses 
such as commentary and comparative advertising that actually facilitate consumer search.”); 
Brian A. Jacobs, Note, Trademark Dilution on the Constitutional Edge, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 
161, 187–88 (2004) (articulating efficiency gains which might flow from the FTDA, namely 
through the reduction of consumer search costs). See also Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in Sixty 
Milliseconds: Trademark Law and Cognitive Science, 86 TEX. L. REV. 507, 526 & nn.88–94 
(2008). 
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such that consumers must provide sellers additional information to 
specify which brand they are referring to (even if they are not 
confused).65 Most notably, in Ty v. Perryman,66 Judge Posner 
provided a search-cost justification for dilution law. According to 
Posner, the concern with dilution is “that consumer search costs will 
rise if a trademark becomes associated with a variety of unrelated 
products,”67 thereby blurring the concise and unequivocal meaning 
of the trademark. Echoing a similar concern, the Ninth Circuit 
recently explained that “the introduction of the [diluting] mark to 
the marketplace means that there are now two products, and not just 
one, competing for association with that word. This is the 
quintessential harm addressed by anti-dilution law.”68  
Posner illustrated this concern by using a hypothetical example 
of an upscale restaurant calling itself “Tiffany.”69 Even if consumers 
will not be confused and believe that the restaurant is a branch of the 
famous jeweler, he explained, “when consumers next see the name 
‘Tiffany’ they may think about both the restaurant and the jewelry 
store, and if so the efficacy of the name as an identifier of the store 
will be diminished. Consumers will have to think harder—incur as it 
were a higher imagination cost—to recognize the name as the name 
of the store.”70 Tarnishment, the second form of dilution, is, 
according to Posner, analytically a subset of blurring.71 Borrowing 
again from Posner’s hypothetical, suppose that it is not an upscale 
restaurant that calls itself “Tiffany,” but rather a striptease joint, and 
assume, again, no consumer confusion about a common source.72 
Nevertheless, “because of the inveterate tendency of the human 
mind to proceed by association,” writes Posner, “every time they 
think of the word ‘Tiffany’ their image of the fancy jewelry store will 
 
 65. Jacobs, supra note 64, at 189. 
 66. Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509 (7th Cir. 2002). Posner also presented a search-
cost-like rationalization for anti-diluation law in an earlier paper. See Richard A. Posner, When 
is Parody Fair Use?, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 67 (1992). 
 67. Ty Inc., 306 F.3d at 511. 
 68. Visa Int’l. Service Ass’n v. JSL Corp., 610 F.3d 1088, 1091 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 69. Ty Inc., 306 F.3d at 511. Posner was probably inspired by Tiffany & Co. v. Boston 
Club, Inc., 231 F. Supp 836 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 1964). 
 70. Ty Inc., 306 F.3d at 511 (italics added). 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  Id. 
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be tarnished by the association of the word with the strip joint.”73 
For reasons later developed in the next Part, it seems to me that 
tarnishment is not really a subset of blurring (in the sense of 
increasing search costs) but rather an instance of interfering with the 
trust functions of the trademarks. Therefore, my current discussion 
will focus only on blurring. I will discuss tarnishment later in the 
next Part. 
B. The Problem with Blurring 
While rooting an anti-dilution or anti-depreciation remedy in 
search costs theory provides a seemingly neat and elegant fit with 
trademark law’s overall consumer-oriented scheme, applying search 
cost rationales in this context suffers from some flaws. Although 
Posner does not provide any scientific reference for his higher 
imagination costs hypothesis, some support can be found in the 
psycholinguistic literature. Careful reading of this literature, 
however, also provides support for the proposition that the problem 
Posner describes, if it is a problem at all,74 hardly manifests itself as 
one that requires a legal remedy.  
In psycholinguistic terms, the phenomenon of blurring can be 
stated as a lexical ambiguity resolution question.75 Clearly, additional 
use of the same trademark to denote another product creates 
ambiguity: rather than one meaning, the same term now has two, 
and the processing time of ambiguous words tends to be longer than 
 
 73. Id; see also Dogan & Lemley supra note 3, at 790; Landes & Posner, supra note 4, 
at 306–07; Maureen A. O’Rourke, Defining the Limites of Free-Riding in Cyberspace: 
Trademark Liability for Metatagging, 33 GONZ. L. REV. 277, 300 (1997) (“Blurring occurs 
when others’ use of the mark ‘dilutes’ the ability of the mark to identify the mark owner’s 
product. In other words, other uses of the mark, while they may not cause confusion, create 
‘noise’ around the mark so as to diminish the ability of the mark to trigger an immediate 
association between the mark and its owner.”). 
 74. In fact, although the psycholinguistic literature supports the propostition that the 
processing time (imagination costs) of ambiguous (blurred) terms can be higher, some studies 
actually discovered an “ambiguity effect,” situations in which the processing time of 
ambiguous terms is shorter than that of non-ambiguous ones. See Stephen J. Lupker, 
Representation and Processing of Lexically Ambigous Words, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
PSYCHOLINGUISTICS 159 (M. Gareth Gaskell ed., Gerry Altmann, Paul Bloom, Alfonso 
Caramazza, & Pim Levelt, consulting eds., Oxford Univ. Press, Inc., 2007).  
 75. In addition to lexical ambiguity, psycholinguists have studied similar types of 
ambiguities, such as structural ambiguity (a sentence such as “enraged cow injures farmer with 
axe”). See TREVOR A. HARLEY, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LANGUAGE 247–50, 254–67 (3d ed. 
2008).  
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that of unambiguous words.76 Ambiguity, however, occurs 
frequently in language. Our language is replete with homophones 
(words which sound the same, such as bank for money and bank of a 
river); homographs (words having different meaning, like lead as in 
leader and lead the metal, which are spelled the same but may not 
necessarily sound the same); and heterographic homophones (words 
like soul and sole, which are spelled differently but sound the same).77 
Encountering such words necessitates some process to ascertain their 
meaning. At least for words with no prior disambiguating context, 
this process comprises two stages. At the lexical access stage, all 
possible meanings of the ambiguous word are initially accessed. 
Next, at the selection stage, one particular meaning is selected and 
integrated with the meaning of the sentence.78 Additionally, if 
disambiguating information that contradicts the selected meaning is 
found, the ambiguous word must be reanalyzed.79 At least two key 
factors affect the processing time: (a) the relative frequency of the 
two meanings of the ambiguous word (whether it is biased or 
equibiased), and (b) the existence of disambiguating information 
which precedes the ambiguous word.80 
One study has found that when an ambiguous word has a 
dominant meaning (i.e., it is biased), readers spend approximately 
the same time processing it as they spend on an (unambiguous) 
control word which is matched in word frequency, and synonymous 
with the less common meaning of the word.81 Contrarily, processing 
 
 76. See generally Susan A. Duffy, Robin K. Morris, & Keith Rayner, Lexical Ambiguity 
and Fixation Times in Reading, 27 J. MEMORY & LANGUAGE 429, 430 (1988) (describing 
two reasons for which increased processing time may be required for (equibiased) ambiguous 
words). 
 77. HARLEY, supra note 75. 
 78. Duffy et al., supra note 76, at 429 (noting that recent research has converged on 
this two-stage model). 
 79. See id. at 430; see also Keith Rayner & Lyn Frazier, Selection Mechanisms in Reading 
Lexically Ambiguous Words, 15 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: LEARNING, MEMORY, & 
COGNITION 779, 779 (1989) (summarizing the results of research employing a cross-modal 
priming technique). 
 80. HARLEY, supra note 75, at 203 (outlining issues of interest to contemporary 
research on lexical ambiguity). 
 81. Keith Rayner & Susan A. Duffy, Lexical Complexity and Fixation Times in Reading: 
Effects of Word Frequency, Verb Complexity, and Lexical Ambiguity, 14 MEMORY & 
COGNITION 191, 198 (1986) (noting also that this finding is consistent with previous studies 
at the authors’ laboratory); see also Duffy et al., supra note 76 (noting that gaze durations are 
not longer for non-equibiased ambiguous nouns because the dominant meaning becomes 
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ambiguous words whose meanings are approximately balanced 
(equibiased ambiguous words), takes longer than processing a 
matched control word.82 Applied to trademarks, these findings could 
suggest that junior uses of famous marks may not actually result in 
higher imagination costs, because (assuming that frequency and fame 
are correlated) the processing time of the famous mark would be 
roughly as if the term was not ambiguous at all. We might still be 
concerned, however, that over time, if the junior use is permitted, 
the two marks might become equibiased, eventually resulting in 
longer processing time, a result that seems consistent with Posner’s 
concern.  
This concern, however, impliedly assumes that the ambiguous 
words are presented in a neutral context (i.e., no potentially 
disambiguating information precedes the ambiguous word). Outside 
the laboratory, words (and trademarks) are rarely encountered 
without disambiguating context. As Rebecca Tushnet argues, 
although the existence of Tiffany-the-restaurant increases the range 
of possible meanings ascribed to the term, this only means that one 
needs context to figure out which Tiffany is being referred to. 
Fortunately, consumers often have that context.83 “Product 
categories, images in ads, and even distinctive fonts can provide 
immediate context for a [trade]mark. Preexisting associations 
reinforce each other so that computer-related meanings of apple are 
more strongly and effectively activated in an Apple Computer ad, 
and fruit-related meanings are activated at the grocery store.”84 In 
other words, while subsequent uses of a trademark may deprive it of 
its ability to function as an unequivocal source identifier when 
considered in abstract, when encountered in context the trademark 
can retain its unequivocal meaning without much difficulty. This 
conclusion is consistent with the psycholinguistic literature which 
found that context plays an important role in reducing the time 
 
available so much earlier than the other meanings that only the dominant meaning is 
considered); Rayner & Frazier, supra note 79, at 786 (finding that, for biased ambiguous 
words, if the sentence processing mechanism only processes one successful integration, 
selection occurs “on the spot”). 
 82. Rayner & Duffy, supra note 81. 
 83. See Tushnet, supra note 64, at 529. 
 84. Id. 
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required to resolve word ambiguity and choose the “correct” 
meaning.85 
Even if lexical ambiguity, while ultimately resolved, increases 
processing time, this phenomenon, while undoubtedly interesting 
for psycholinguists, hardly manifests itself as a social problem 
requiring a legal solution.86 First of all, even when the 
psycholinguistic studies identify an increase in processing time, the 
effect of the ambiguity will only result in up to 200 milliseconds in 
processing time.87 It is difficult to identify a phenomenon to which 
the application of the principle of de minimis non curat lex might be 
more appropriate. Second, ambiguity that leads to increased 
processing time is not limited to the province of trademarks. In fact, 
“[s]emantic ambiguity is a fact of life for readers/speakers of most 
languages.”88 If a judicial crusade against ambiguity is warranted, 
there is no reason to limit it to trademark ambiguity. Let us eradicate 
all ambiguous words. After all, ambiguous words likely outnumber 
ambiguous trademarks both in quantity and in frequency,89 and the 
savings in imagination costs would be much more substantial. In 
reality, however, rather than a cause for concern, the findings of 
psycholinguistics provide a reason to celebrate. As Lupker concludes, 
“[t]he fact that our processing systems seem to allow resolution of 
these ambiguities so rapidly that we hardly notice them is testimony 
to a very sophisticated set of language skills.”90  
 
 85. In linguistic terms, when a listener hears a particular word, she activates a particular 
lexical representation. Experimentation conducted by Dahan and Tanenhaus “strongly 
support[s] the hypothesis that the activation of lexical representations during the recognition 
of a spoken word is affected by immediate semantic integration with context.” Delphine Dahan 
& Michael. K. Tanenhaus, Continuous Mapping from Sound to Meaning in Spoken-Language 
Comprehension: Immediate Effects of Verb-Based Thematic Constraints, 30 J. EXPERIMENTAL 
PSYCHOL.: LEARNING MEMORY AND COGNITION 498, 505 (2004). 
 86. Cf. Tushnet, supra note 64, at 528 (distinguishing between statistical and practical 
significance). 
 87. See, e.g., Mark S. Seidenberg et al., Automatic Access of the Meanings of Ambiguous 
Words in Context: Some Limitations of Knowledge-Based Processing, 14 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 
489, 525 (1982) (noting that, for words with similar “activation levels,” the decision at the 
“integration stage” occurs “within a 200-msec window, although it may take less time”); see 
also Rayner & Frazier, supra note 79, at 779. 
 88. Lupker, supra note 74, at 171.  
 89. With the exception of fanciful trademarks, which are trademarks that have no 
meaning other than the trademark itself, all trademarks are at least comprised of words having 
a non-trademark meaning.  
 90. Lupker, supra note 74, at 171. 
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Interestingly, in Visa International Service Ass’n v. JSL Corp.,91 
Chief Judge Kozinski recently seemed to be somewhat sensitive to 
the role that context plays in resolving lexical ambiguities, but 
unfortunately failed to follow the logical consequences of his 
sensitivity. In this case the defendant Orr, who ran an online 
“multilingual education and information business” named eVisa was 
sued by Visa International, the financial services company, who 
claimed that its trademark was diluted.92 Orr argued that the plaintiff 
cannot enjoin him from using the word visa, which is a common 
word in English. Chief Judge Kozinski rejected the argument. 
Although he conceded that the plaintiff would not be entitled to 
enjoin the defendant from using the word visa as his trademark if he 
used it in its common dictionary meaning, e.g, “Orr’s Visa Services,” 
such use would be permissible because it “would not create a new 
association for the word with a product; it would merely evoke the 
word’s existing dictionary meaning, as to which no one may claim 
exclusivity.”93 However, he went on to explain that  
  
 This multiplication of meanings is the essence of dilution by 
blurring. Use of the word “visa” to refer to travel visas is 
permissible because it doesn’t have this effect; the word elicits only 
the standard dictionary definition. Use of the word visa in a 
trademark to refer to a good or service other than a travel visa, as in 
this case, undoubtedly does have this effect; the word becomes 
associated with two products, rather than one. This is true even 
when use of the word also gestures at the word’s dictionary 
definition.94  
 
According to Kozinski, although Visa International used a 
common English word, it was entitled to trademark protection 
because it took the word away from its standard dictionary meaning 
and used it in a unique way in a commercial context. Orr’s 
culpability lies in doing the same thing. Orr took the same word and 
used it in a unique way for another (and non-confusing) commercial 
purpose. The reason why the plaintiff’s act warrants trademark 
 
 91. Visa Int’l Service Ass’n v. JSL Corp., 610 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 92. Id. at 1089.  
 93. Id. at 1092. 
 94. Id. 
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protection while the defendant’s act warrants an injunction is that 
the defendant’s act resulted in multiplication of meaning.95 This 
reasoning is faulty. If multiplication of meaning is harmful, then it is 
not clear why the law tolerates one act of multiplication (taking a 
common word and giving it a new meaning by using it as a 
trademark) but condemns any subsequent multiplication of meaning. 
It seems that Judge Kozinski’s answer would be that meaning 
multiplication is harmful only when it occurs within the commercial 
context, because only there the two words denote two products 
competing for association with the word. Apparently, a commercial 
meaning does not compete for association with the word when used 
in its dictionary meaning, but two commercial meanings would 
compete with each other.  
Our analysis supports the first part of Kozinski’s reasoning but 
not the second. There should be no reason for concern when a seller 
adopts a common English word as a trademark in an arbitrary or 
even suggestive way because despite the creation of new meaning the 
different context dispels the ambiguity. But context can dispel lexical 
ambiguity just as effectively even when the two words are used for 
commercial purposes. There is no reason to assume that the context 
in which the word is used allows people to distinguish without 
difficulty between visa as a travel document and visa as a credit card, 
but that people are incapable of using context to distinguish between 
visa as a credit card and eVisa as a multilingual information and 
education business. If context matters then context matters. 
Be that as it may, I am willing to proceed on the assumption that 
there might be some cases in which additional uses of a trademark 
could blur its meaning in a way that context cannot always prevent, 
and that in such cases, blurring—in the sense of higher search 
costs—might occur.  
For example, suppose that before celebrating the first anniversary 
of their relationship John phones his girlfriend, Jane, and tells her: 
“It’s our anniversary. Let’s celebrate at Tiffany tonight. I’ll meet you 
there at 7.” It is plausible that the context in which this invitation is 
extended will not clarify whether Jane should go to the jeweler or to 
the restaurant. Consequently, Jane will have to incur an additional 
cost in the form of asking “which Tiffany?” While asking this 
question and hearing the answer can last several full seconds rather 
 
 95. Id. 
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than milliseconds, this cost may still seem too trivial to be concerned 
about.  
But we could imagine less trivial verification costs, or cases in 
which context may actually be misleading. Suppose that Jane, 
wishfully thinking that John will propose to her, believes he is 
suggesting that they meet at the jeweler’s in order to choose a ring, 
whereas John, who has no intentions to marry yet, suggested Tiffany 
simply because he just read a good online review about the 
restaurant. Hurrying to the jeweler, Jane waits desperately while 
anxious John is biting his fingernails at the restaurant. Eventually the 
two realize the misunderstanding and get together, but the ensuing 
fight and mutual accusations end in a tragic break up. Obviously, the 
costs of this clichéd scenario are higher than previously discussed. 
Even here, however, it does not necessarily follow that the law 
should prohibit the subsequent use of the term Tiffany simply 
because in some cases some additional search cost will be imposed as 
a result of simultaneous uses of the term. When all things are equal, 
reducing search costs is a laudable goal. But in real life not all things 
are equal. Frequently in life, achieving one goal may come at the 
expense of frustrating others, meaning that occasionally, depending 
on what else is at stake, additional search or imagination costs may 
be worth incurring, and may be willingly incurred by consumers.  
For example, in every vibrant and competitive market consumers 
must incur some search costs when looking for the best deal, 
comparing various product attributes and various prices. Only in the 
two extreme and rare occasions of perfect monopoly or perfect 
competition are search costs truly minimal. In the case of monopoly, 
there are minimal search costs because there is only one seller for 
every type of product, and in the case of perfect competition, search 
costs are small because all products are homogenous and all sellers 
charge the same price, rendering search for the best deal 
unnecessary. But in less than perfectly competitive markets 
comprised of differentiated products, consumers do have to incur 
some search costs (and these are precisely the markets in which 
trademarks are socially valuable and worth protecting). Therefore, 
some level of search cost can be simply regarded as unavoidable 
friction, and noting that an activity imposes a higher search cost does 
not in itself provide sufficient grounds for prohibiting it. Claiming 
that the mere increase in search cost justifies prohibiting any junior 
non-confusing use of a trademark is not unlike claiming that, 
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because less-than-perfect competition entails some increased search 
cost, we are all better off with monopoly, or that we should prohibit 
product differentiation because differentiation increases search costs. 
Rather than accepting that some search costs can be regarded as 
unavoidable friction in the market, the focus on minimizing search 
costs as the sole purpose of trademark law inevitably leads to the 
conclusion that the first adopter of any trademark should be given an 
exclusive right to it regardless of context, because any additional use 
might increase someone’s search cost.  
Of course, search costs can impede trade beyond mere 
unavoidable friction by making the choice among various options so 
perplexing that the consumer may defer making a choice, or avoid 
buying altogether.96 This is why, for example, both manufacturers 
and retailers undertake strategies to optimize the number and type of 
competing brands they offer.97 But manufacturers’ and retailers’ 
decisions to produce or stock more than one brand indicate that 
there is benefit in so doing despite some higher search cost inflicted 
on consumers. Therefore, higher search costs can justify anti-dilution 
law only if the subsequent use of the trademark results in increased 
net cost, or, in other words, when no social benefits compensate for 
the increase in search costs. In principle, this may happen in two 
types of cases. The first, when the subsequent use raises search costs 
without providing any social benefit; the second, when the 
subsequent use has some redeeming value, but nonetheless creates 
such mental clutter that a large enough number of consumers 
respond by avoiding the transaction altogether.  
 
 96. See, e.g., Alexander Chernev, When More is Less and Less is More: The Role of Ideal 
Point Availability and Assortment in Consumer Choice, 30 J. CONSUMER RES. 170, 171 
(2003) (“[O]ne can argue that large assortments might . . . lead to weaker preferences because 
of increased demand on an individual’s cognitive resources associated with the extra effort 
required to evaluate the attractiveness of alternatives in the large assortment.”); Cynthia 
Huffman & Barbara E. Kahn, Variety for Sale: Mass Customization or Mass Confusion?, 74 J. 
RETAILING 491, 491 (1998) (citation omitted) (“Large assortment strategies . . . can backfire, 
however, if the complexity causes information overload such that a customer feels 
overwhelmed and dissatisfied, or chooses not to make a choice at all.”); Amos Tversky & Eldar 
Shafir, Choice Under Conflict: The Dynamics of Deferred Decision, 3 PSYCHOL. SCI. 358, 358 
(1992) (hypothesizing that an increase in “conflict”—analogous to search costs—compels 
consumers to defer choice). 
 97. See, e.g., Proctor and Gamble’s decision to cut back the number of brand varieties it 
offers in Zachary Schiller, Greg Burns & Karen Lowry Miller, Make it Simple, BUS. WK., Sept. 
9, 1996, at 96. 
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Panavision v. Toeppen,98 a cybersquatting case decided on 
dilution grounds, provides an example of the first type of case, but it 
is also a case which the court unnecessarily, and mistakenly, 
considered to be of the second type. In this case Panavision wanted 
to create a website using the domain name panavision.com. It could 
not do that, however, because the domain name had been previously 
registered by the defendant Toeppen, which used it for a website 
displaying photographs of the City of Pana, Illinois.99 Assuming, as 
seems reasonable, that Toeppen’s only purpose in registering the 
domain name and setting up the website was reselling it to 
Panavision, his use of the trademark would result in net social cost.100 
One cost would be incurred by people typing the string 
panavision.com in their Internet browsers assuming it would point to 
Panavision’s website, finding the images of Pana, Illinois instead. 
Other costs would be incurred by both Panavision and Toeppen 
while trying to negotiate purchasing the domain name from 
Toeppen in order to put it to more efficient use, supposedly by 
Panavision. Because this is a situation of bilateral monopoly 
(Panavision can buy the asset only from Toeppen, and Toeppen can 
sell it only to Panavision101) in which the parties have asymmetric 
information as to how valuable the domain name may be, high 
transaction costs make bargaining socially wasteful. Both Panavision 
and Toeppen face a range of acceptable potential prices; ascertaining 
and bargaining within this range can be extremely costly. Indeed, the 
parties may never reach a deal, in which case consumers would 
 
 98. Panavision Int’l., L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 99. Id. at 1319.  
 100. Apparently, Toeppen was a serial cybersquatter. See id.  
 101. This is also assuming that there is no other company who can have a legitimate 
claim to the trademark “Panavision.” As of Sept. 23, 2010, the USPTO database contains 23 
records for the word mark “Panavision.” With the exception of three records (all of which are 
records for abandoned applications), all 23 records seem to be related to Panavision the 
plaintiff. See UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE: TRADEMARK ELECTRONIC 
SEARCH SYSTEM (TESS), http://tess2.uspto.gov (last visited Jan. 7, 2011). A Google search 
on Sept. 23, 2010 for the term “panavision” yielded one company in South Africa that did not 
seem to be related to Panavision the plaintiff. See PANAVISION, http://www.panavision.co.za 
(last visited Jan. 7, 2011). Its website states that the company specializes “in the design and 
installation of custom home entertainment and automation systems” and that the company has 
14 years of experience in the field. Id. Even if the company could have a potentially valid U.S. 
claim to the trademark (a questionable proposition given the related field it operates in and the 
resulting likelihood of confusion with the American Panavision), the company did not exist in 
1995, when Toeppen registered the domain name “panavision.com.” 
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continually be forced to incur additional search costs to reach 
Panavision’s website.102 Because Toeppen’s use created mere costs, 
but no social benefit, even the slight increase in consumer search cost 
justifies the court’s finding of dilution.  
The court could have reached this result even without making 
the unnecessary—and probably incorrect—prediction that 
“[p]rospective users of plaintiff’s services who mistakenly access 
defendant’s web site may fail to continue to search for plaintiff’s own 
home page, due to anger, frustration or the belief that the plaintiff’s 
home page does not exist.”103 This prediction seems farfetched, 
because it ignores the ease of correction that the relevant 
technology, the Internet, enables. People interested in Panavision’s 
website who stumble upon Toeppen’s site might be surprised to see 
images from Pana, Illinois. Some may be slightly amused, others may 
be slightly angry. But it is unlikely that they will fail to continue 
searching for Panavision’s home page. More likely, they will use a 
search engine and reach Panvision’s website without much difficulty, 
despite the court’s misgivings about search engines’ utility.104 
Nonetheless, given the virtually nonexistent social benefits arising 
from Toeppen’s act, even this slight increase in consumer search cost 
is worth avoiding.  
The last point highlights a more general one: whether diluting an 
unequivocal meaning of a trademark results in such debilitating 
mental clutter depends on consumers’ ability to disambiguate. As 
 
 102. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 62 (7th ed. 2007) 
(“[B]ilateral monopoly . . . is a social problem, because the bargaining costs incurred by each 
party in an effort to engross as much of the profit of the transaction as possible are a social 
waste.”); see also Gerard N. Magliocca, One and Inseparable: Dilution and Infringement in 
Trademark Law, 85 MINN. L. REV. 949, 1028–29 (2001). I assume that there are no other 
companies named Panavision who would be interested in buying the domain name, and that 
although Panavision’s competitors might be interested in purchasing the domain name this 
may lead to actionable confusion. For an economic analysis of bilateral monopoly, see JEAN 
TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 22, 25 (1988); KENNETH D. 
GEORGE, CAROLINE JOLL & E. L. LYNK, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION: COMPETITION, 
GROWTH AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE 70–72 (4th ed. 1992). 
 103. Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1327 (quoting Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. 282, 
306–07 (D.N.J. 1998) (Lechner, J.) (quoting Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am., Inc. v. 
Bucci, 1997 WL 133313, 4 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (Wood, J.))). 
 104. Id. Arguably, some individuals will not bother looking for Panavision’s home page 
after the first failed attempt because they will find the effort not worth their while. However, 
most likely those will be individuals who value viewing Panavision’s website only so slightly, 
that the loss suffered by them and by Panavision is minimal.  
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noted before, sometimes context will prevent any ambiguity from 
ever occurring. Sometimes the ability to disambiguate will depend 
on the relevant technology and how it affects the cost of taking an 
additional inquiring step to eliminate ambiguity. In some online 
contexts, search engines can do that. In other contexts, asking a 
simple question would suffice.  
When consumers have the ability to disambiguate, concurrent 
uses of the same mark can be socially beneficial despite additional 
search costs that might be incurred. Suppose, for example, that 
Tiffany-the-restaurant had been the first to register tiffany.com as its 
domain name after having used the word “Tiffany” as its trademark. 
Assuming again that there is no consumer confusion, it cannot be 
said that there is no social benefit in allowing it to use the word as a 
trademark and in the domain name. We can presume that if from all 
possible trademarks, the restaurant chose Tiffany, it did so because it 
believed this would be a useful non-confusing trademark. Moreover, 
it is plausible that by using “Tiffany” as its trademark, the restaurant 
did not mean to use it merely as a source identifier but perhaps also 
intended, by alluding to the jeweler, to use the name heuristically, to 
convey a message that it is an upscale restaurant.105 If it actually did 
so, then such use of the mark is quite consistent with the search cost 
theory of trademarks because it efficiently provides useful 
information to consumers.  
Therefore, this example differs from the Panavision case. An 
upscale restaurant’s use of the famous trademark Tiffany could 
provide some social benefit, unlike Toeppen’s activities which did 
not. But to the extent that the use of the mark by the restaurant 
creates some ambiguity about what the trademark stands for, it also 
entails some higher search cost. Whether this results in net social cost 
or net social benefit depends on the size of the benefit and the cost 
 
 105. Apparently, this, or a similar motive was the reason why the defendant in Tiffany & 
Co. v. Boston Club, Inc., 231 F. Supp. 836 (D. Mass. 1964), chose the name Tiffany. The 
defendant’s principal executive officer testified that he chose the name Tiffany because it was a 
Boston or British well-sounding name with connotations of quality. Id. at 841. Moreover, 
“advertisements placed at the time the defendants assumed the name ‘Tiffany’s’ stressed 
‘dining in elegant surroundings of a by-gone era,’ ‘an atmosphere of graciousness and charm of 
Beacon Hill in its glory,’ ‘dining on the finest of native New England fare and exquisite 
Continental Dishes.’” Id. at 843. This actually helped to substantiate the charge that plaintiff’s 
trademark was tarnished, because the restaurant’s quality rapidly deteriorated. Although 
plaintiff prevailed on its state dilution claims, the court also found liability on confusion 
grounds. 
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of dispelling the ambiguity. Thus, as mentioned earlier, when an 
invitation to meet at Tiffany does not provide enough context to 
reveal which Tiffany the speaker is referring to, a simple question 
such as “which Tiffany?” may dispel the ambiguity, which may 
render the cost/benefit balance positive after all. Similarly, in an 
online context some additional search cost might be incurred if 
Tiffany-the-restaurant had first registered tiffany.com. A consumer 
looking for the jeweler but stumbling upon the restaurant’s website 
might have to incur a minimal search cost by using a search engine 
to find the desired Tiffany. But given that the use of the mark and 
the domain name by both sellers is socially beneficial, it is not clear 
that this minimal higher search cost is not worth incurring. 
Moreover, unlike in Panavision, this is not a situation of bilateral 
monopoly because the restaurant can benefit from using the domain 
name for its own website, not only from reselling it. Therefore, we 
can anticipate an efficient Coasean trade—that is, if using the domain 
name to point to the jeweler’s website is more valuable than using it 
to point to the restaurant’s website, we can anticipate the parties 
entering into a deal for its transfer.  
A different calculus might exist if a driver on the highway en 
route to Tiffany-the-jeweler encounters a sign saying “Tiffany, next 
exit, 50 miles,” only to discover, upon arrival, that he had reached 
the restaurant rather than the jeweler. In this case, the correction 
cost can be quite large. The driver would have to drive back to the 
highway, but will now have less confidence in any sign, or may 
simply have run out of time. As a result, he may forego looking for 
the jeweler altogether. But while this may seem like a proper example 
of harmful dilution, even here ambiguity may be prevented by simple 
means (e.g., by adding some context to the sign such as adding “the 
restaurant,” or logos, etc.), and it can be expected that subsequent 
users of marks who are not attempting to pass themselves off will 
have an incentive to provide such clues. If the ambiguity leads one 
mistaken jewelry customer to the restaurant, it can similarly divert 
away a customer interested in the restaurant but thinking that the 
sign belongs to the jeweler. It is unlikely that the restaurant will 
benefit from the former and it is likely that it will lose from the 
latter.  
All of this leads to a crucial distinction between the linguistic and 
the trust functions of trademarks and the different harms caused by 
confusion and dilution. As I identified earlier, trademarks reduce 
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search costs by providing a concise and unequivocal source identifier. 
In this sense trademarks improve the technology of communication. 
Like other words, they provide terms that denote what would 
otherwise be a more complex and more difficult to articulate 
meaning. I called this result trademarks’ linguistic function. But 
trademarks also, and more importantly, help in fostering trust in the 
messages conveyed by sellers to prevent markets for goods with 
search and credence attributes from becoming markets for lemons. I 
called this trademarks’ trust function. As discussed in the previous 
Parts, confusing uses of a trademark affect both functions, and the 
prohibition on confusing uses of another mark promotes both 
functions.  
In contrast to cases of confusion, dilution by blurring affects only 
trademarks’ linguistic function. When context is insufficient to dispel 
ambiguity dilution by blurring may increase some search costs, but it 
will not result in a lemonization of the market. Even if consumers 
have to think harder to identify the proper seller, this does not 
diminish their ability to trust her messages once identified. A 
consumer familiar with Tiffany-the-jeweler encountering the Tiffany-
the-restaurant might have to incur a higher imagination cost, or 
verification cost, to dispel the ambiguity. He may not initially know 
which of the two distinct sellers the mark refers to, but once the 
ambiguity is cleared he may fully trust that no other jeweler passes 
itself off as Tiffany. He may trust the genuineness of the message 
conveyed by the mark and rely on it in making his purchasing 
decision. As long as the disambiguation cost is not prohibitively 
high, no market failure exists.  
In sum, an information-based view of trademark law provides 
only a limited support for anti-dilution laws based on blurring. Since 
dilution by blurring only affects the linguistic function but not the 
trust function of trademarks, the subset of cases in which it can be 
justifiably applied to is limited to begin with. And while blurring may 
perhaps increase consumer search cost in some cases, whether it 
results in a net increase in costs depends on the cost of 
disambiguation and whether the subsequent non-confusing use of 
the mark provides some social benefits. Because in many cases 
disambiguation costs are rather low and the subsequent use is 
socially beneficial, only rarely will blurring result in a net increase in 
costs. This makes the case for anti-dilution laws, albeit not totally 
non-existent, weak nonetheless.  
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C. Initial Interest Confusion 
The doctrine of initial interest confusion provides another 
example of practices that might interfere with the linguistic function 
of trademarks and increase search costs without necessarily impeding 
the trust function. Initial interest confusion “refers to a potential 
purchaser’s temporary confusion about the actual source of goods or 
services under consideration, even where that confusion is resolved 
by the actual moment of sale.”106 In other words, in initial interest 
confusion cases “[i]nfringement can be based upon confusion that 
creates initial customer interest, even though no actual sale is finally 
completed as a result of the confusion.”107 The paradigmatic example 
is the hypothetical one provided by the Ninth Circuit in Brookfield 
Communications v. West Coast Entertainment: 
Suppose West Coast’s competitor (let’s call it “Blockbuster”) puts 
up a billboard on a highway reading— “West Coast Video: 2 miles 
ahead at Exit 7”—where West Coast is really located at Exit 8 but 
Blockbuster is located at Exit 7. Customers looking for West 
Coast’s store will pull off at Exit 7 and drive around looking for it. 
Unable to locate West Coast, but seeing the Blockbuster store right 
by the highway entrance, they may simply rent there.108 
While it would be difficult to defend and easy to condemn an 
advertising scheme such as that in the billboard example, courts in 
recent years have expanded the scope of initial interest confusion 
from brick-and-mortar, bait-and-switch cases to online cases 
involving domain names, website metatags, and keyword 
advertising.109 This development has garnered much criticism. In 
particular, some decisions110 were criticized for confusing consumer 
confusion-based diversion with consumer information-based 
 
 106. Hearts on Fire Co. v. Blue Nile, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 2d 274, 283 (D. Mass. 2009). 
 107. 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 23:6 (4th ed. 2010). 
 108. Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1062 (9th 
Cir. 1999). 
 109. Hearts on Fire, 603 F. Supp. 2d at 284–85; Dogan & Lemley, supra note 3, at 781. 
 110. E.g., Brookfield, 174 F.3d 274; Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 
354 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2004); Promatek Indus., Ltd. v. Equitrac Corp., 300 F.3d 808 (7th 
Cir. 2002); People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 
2001); 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, 309 F. Supp. 2d 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).  
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diversion. Dogan & Lemely, for example, applying a search-cost 
framework, explain:  
[t]o the extent that advertisers use deception to misdirect 
consumers to their products . . . they are hindering information 
flow and should be enjoined. But the fact that an advertiser uses a 
keyword to reach a consumer with accurate information that is of 
interest to that consumer cannot itself be “confusion,” whether of 
initial interest or any other variety. It may be a diversion of 
consumer attention, but if the consumer is not confused, that 
diversion is simply not illegal. The presentation of viable 
alternatives or the truthful description of a competitor’s capabilities 
do not distort the market; to the contrary, this information 
contributes to a robust and fully informed market.111 
Dogan & Lemley warn against the emergence of initial interest 
confusion as a stand-alone doctrine, divorced from traditional 
confusion, and they fault courts for substituting initial interest 
confusion for proof of actual confusion or likelihood thereof.112 
Indeed, in Dogan & Lemley’s view, cases involving initial interest 
confusion and traditional confusion are analytically identical, and 
both types of confusion should, in appropriate cases, be enjoined, 
provided that the confusion involves an increase in consumer search 
costs.113 Their main criticism of the recent cases was that those cases 
enjoined benign practices that involved highly speculative or no 
confusion.114  
Dogan & Lemley are rightly concerned that an expansive version 
of the doctrine might run counter to the information-enhancing 
goals of trademark law by reducing the ability of competitors and 
other players to provide information that consumers deem useful. 
However, they base their analysis exclusively on search costs, thus 
ignoring an important difference between initial interest confusion 
and traditional confusion, namely, the different ways in which initial 
interest confusion and traditional confusion affect the trust function. 
This exclusive focus on the linguistic function may limit the utility of 
Dogan & Lemley’s approach to constraining the expansion of initial 
interest confusion.  
 
 111. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 3, at 819–20 (citation omitted). 
 112. Id. at 781, 825. 
 113. Id. at 825. 
 114. Id. at 814–16. 
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For Dogan & Lemley, there is a clear dichotomy between 
confusion-based diversion and information-based diversion. The 
problem is that this distinction may not be self-evident when 
adjudicating real cases. The court in Hearts on Fire was somewhat 
sensitive to this problem. The court noted that the billboard example 
lies at one end of a spectrum, whereas the other end involves cases of 
genuine consumer choice without any confusion, such as in the 
hypothetical case of a Pepsi sponsored link triggered by an Internet 
user’s search for the “Coca-Cola” trademark.115 According to the 
court, many cases will fall somewhere between the two end-points 
and a court’s task would be “to distinguish between them.”116 I 
suspect that the challenge is bigger than merely distinguishing 
between benign information enhancing cases and malignant 
confusion cases, because at least some benign practices—whether 
online or offline—might involve at least some initial confusion. For 
example, initial confusion might be a prerequisite for certain types of 
parodies, whereby the initial confusion and the subsequent revelation 
of the parody’s true content create the comic effect. In other cases, 
ruling out some initial confusion might be very difficult.  
For example, a manufacturer of cola might use gold coloration 
on cola cans—just like its competitor—to indicate that the cola is 
caffeine-free.117 This similarity in appearance may reduce search costs 
by making it easier for the consumer to compare competing 
brands,118 and assuming the two products have enough other 
distinguishing factors, the coloration should be considered benign 
(i.e., non-infringing). But this practice might simultaneously involve 
some initial confusion. A consumer familiar with the first brand 
might be attracted to the competing brand from afar because of the 
similarity—that is, she may be initially confused—even though she 
will probably recognize the difference between the brands once she 
picks up the can or even earlier as she approaches the shelf. 
Therefore, the challenge is not simply to distinguish between acts 
that confuse and acts that do not, but rather to identify and preserve 
 
 115. Hearts on Fire Co. v. Blue Nile, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 2d. 274, 285 n.9 (D. Mass. 
2009) (“Coca-Cola would have difficulty suing Pepsi for infringement on an initial interest 
theory because these two products are widely recognized as competitors and, accordingly, the 
likelihood of consumer confusion is exceedingly small.”).  
 116. Id. at 287. 
 117. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 64, at 1235. 
 118. Id. 
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acts that, while they might initially confuse, possess enough 
redeeming virtues so that on balance they should be considered 
benign. The danger is that an exclusive focus on reducing search 
costs might create a strong presumption of illegality upon the mere 
showing of some confusion,119 even when on balance this confusion 
is harmless.  
Acknowledging the importance of the trust function might help 
avoid such an outcome, because it reveals a categorical difference 
between traditional confusion (as in passing off cases) and initial 
interest confusion. As discussed above, traditional confusion 
jeopardizes both the linguistic and the trust functions of trademarks, 
thereby justifying strong condemnation.120 Cases of initial interest 
confusion categorically implicate only the linguistic function—they 
may increase search costs to some degree or another, but they do not 
implicate the trust function because, by definition, no confusion 
survives to the point of sale. Therefore, once the initial confusion 
dissipates and the consumer realizes whom she is dealing with, she 
can reliably trust the trademark to signify whatever attributes the 
brand stands for.  
Because, unlike traditional confusion, initial interest confusion 
implicates only the linguistic function and not the trust function, the 
normative basis for condemning initial interest confusion cases is 
weaker from the outset. Then, what makes cases that resemble the 
paradigmatic bait-and-switch billboard example undoubtedly 
problematic, and what distinguishes those cases from the various 
Internet cases to which the doctrine has been extended, is not that 
the former involve confusion akin to that of traditional confusion 
cases whereas the latter categorically involve no confusion 
whatsoever. The critical difference is that the billboard-like cases 
merit easy condemnation because they involve net (and presumably 
substantial) increases in search cost—a conclusion easily arrived at 
because they hardly involve any benefit. In contrast, many of the 
cases decided under the extended form of initial interest confusion 
 
 119. Hearts on Fire, 603 F. Supp. 2d. at 286 (“[O]nline merchants may well be tempted 
to blur these distinctions [between confusion-based diversion and information-based 
diversion], hoping to create and capitalize on initial consumer confusion. Such conduct 
undoubtedly begins to sound in trademark infringement. Thus, where a plaintiff has plausibly 
alleged some consumer confusion, even at an initial stage of his product search, the question is 
a far closer one.”). 
 120. See supra Part IV.  
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concerned practices involving minimal, if any, increase in search 
costs, which were easily outweighed by other benefits. In other 
words, in many of those cases liability should not have been found 
even if they involved some initial confusion. Recognizing this 
difference will allow courts more easily to dismiss in a summary 
judgment cases alleging only initial interest confusion, because the 
factual question of whether confusion exists becomes much less 
important. 
The conclusion regarding initial interest confusion is similar to 
that arrived at with regard to dilution by blurring. Unlike 
conditional confusion, which implicates both the linguistic and the 
trust functions, initial interest confusion at most implicates only the 
linguistic function. While an information-based conception of 
trademarks can justify a prohibition on initial interest confusion, this 
justification is limited to cases that involve net increases in search 
costs. The number of such cases is probably very small.  
VII. NORMATIVE AMBIGUITY II: RULES PROMOTING THE TRUST 
FUNCTION BUT NOT THE LINGUISTIC FUNCTION 
A. Tarnishment 
While in Ty v. Perryman Judge Posner considered dilution by 
tarnishment as a subset of blurring, thus implying an impairment of 
the linguistic function through an increase in search costs, 
tarnishment can be seen more properly as an impairment of 
trademarks’ trust function. This view may be implied from Landes & 
Posner treatment of tarnishment in their 2003 book, whereby they 
explain:  
The idea behind the tarnishment concept is that the company’s 
“goodwill”—roughly, the producer surplus that it obtains because 
its products have a good reputation for quality and consistency—
may be impaired by association of its trademarks with activities, 
such as the traffic in illicit drugs, that offend many consumers.121 
If acts done by others can decrease the reliability of the signals 
conveyed by a trademark, then the trademark’s trust function can be 
impaired; an impairment of the trust function may get us closer to 
the lemon-market zone. Note that the reliability now referred to is 
 
 121. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 3, at 160. 
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not that of the signal itself, being more noisy or blurred, but rather 
the reliability of the signified as a trustworthy seller, or as a product 
having desirable but unobservable attributes. That is, there is no 
question who the seller or which product it is, but doubt may arise 
about how truly reliable he or the product are.122 For example, 
consider a used-cars dealer who has avoided the lemons problem by 
developing a reputation for honesty, and assume that someone 
spreads a rumor that the dealer had been engaged in some 
fraudulent scheme, albeit in an unrelated area. This new information 
about the car dealer may undoubtedly reduce his reliability because 
potential customers might rationally believe that if he had been 
engaged in a fraudulent scheme in one area he might defraud them 
as well. Of course, if the rumor contains correct information, then 
consumers may rightly be suspicious and the dealer ought not to be 
trusted as before. But if the rumor is false, a reliable dealer will not 
be trusted, an undesirable result for both the dealer and his 
consumers. No wonder, then, that defamation law has provided 
remedies in such situations for generations.  
Similarly, a product may have desirable credence attributes, but 
since consumers cannot verify these attributes, competitors can easily 
undermine consumers’ trust in the product or its seller by falsely 
suggesting that the product lacks those attributes, or by falsely 
suggesting that their products possess even better qualities. Such 
activity may be federally actionable as trade libel and product 
disparagement under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act.123 
Dilution by tarnishment targets a different activity, albeit 
arguably with the same result. Tarnishment seems to be concerned 
not about spreading disparaging information on the seller or her 
product, but rather about the danger that using the trademark of a 
reputable seller for activities with ill repute, even in the absence of 
any likelihood of confusion or association between the two, will 
transfer the ill repute of the latter to the former. The theory here 
seems to be that no matter how much they try, consumers cannot 
get the negative connotation of the second use of the mark out of 
 
 122. See Beebe, supra note 1, at 695. 
 123. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 5 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 27:10 (4th ed. 2010). 
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their minds and cannot avoid transferring some of that negativity to 
the reputable seller.124 
Landes & Posner provide two examples to illustrate this 
phenomenon. They claim that homosexual groups’ attempts to use 
“Pink Panther” to identify themselves have caused fear of negative 
effects on the trademark owner’s revenues and that this effect might 
have resulted even if consumers were not confused into believing 
that the trademark owner had authorized the use of the mark.125 
They also claim that very few people are named “Adolf” because of 
the name’s negative associations.126 
While tarnishment—if this phenomenon exits—may be similar to 
defamation in its effect, its underlying mechanism is not identical. 
While negative information about a person may obviously harm that 
person’s reputation, it is less obvious why negative information about 
a third party will harm the reputation of another person with the 
same name—when everyone knows the two people are separate 
individuals. This critical link between the negative information and 
the person affected by it seems to be missing from the tarnishment 
theory. Moreover, as Rebecca Tushnet notes, very little empirical 
work in this area actually substantiates the mechanism of 
tarnishment.127 She points out the dearth of studies on this 
phenomenon and suggests that valuable insights may be learned 
from studies undertaken by marketing researchers who have studied 
the related question of brand extension, which may negatively affect 
a brand owner when she introduces a new but bad product or enters 
into a marketing alliance with a partner who fell into disrepute.128 
She argues that these studies suggest that “dilution by tarnishment 
through the use of a similar mark on a shoddy product is unlikely in 
the absence of source confusion.”129  
Interestingly, the Pink Panther case, to which Landes & Posner 
probably refer,130 was decided in favor of the trademark owner on 
 
 124. See Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 511 (7th Cir. 2002).  
 125. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 3, at 161.  
 126. Id. at 207. 
 127. Tushnet, supra note 64, at 542–43. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 543.  
 130. Notably, it is not clear whether Landes & Posner mention the case as evidence that 
tarnishment happens, or merely as evidence that the trademark owners fear that it might. They 
write: “If the parodist wants to use the original work in a way potentially offensive to the 
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confusion grounds rather than dilution.131 In that case, a gay-rights 
group in New York City created the “Pink Panther Patrol” to 
protect gays from street violence.132 In prohibiting the use of 
MGM’s trademark, the court assumed that people would believe that 
MGM sponsored the group.133 Finding in favor of the plaintiff under 
federal trademark law, the court did not consider the plaintiff’s 
parallel claim under the New York State anti-dilution statute.134 
Landes & Posner’s Adolf example, which at a first glance sounds 
quite plausible, may not really describe the process of known marks 
or names tarnished by subsequent shoddy or objectionable uses. 
Unlike dilution claims in which a well-known mark is used by a less-
known user, the Adolf example involves an ordinary name 
“tarnished” after being used by one of the most notorious people in 
history. Arguably, Hitler turned Adolf, a previously ordinary name, 
into a well-known “brand.” In fact, peoples’ present reluctance to 
use the name because of its Nazi connotation may add additional 
support to the point made earlier, namely that junior uses of famous 
marks are unlikely to dilute them because (assuming that frequency 
and fame are correlated) the processing time of the famous mark 
would be roughly as if the term was not ambiguous at all.135  
To conclude this point, while in principle tarnishment may 
impair the trust function of trademarks, and regulation of 
tarnishment may be justified on that basis, the theoretical and 
empirical support for this proposition seems to be rather weak at this 
stage.  
But nonetheless, dilution by tarnishment does possess some 
intuitive appeal. It does not seem totally implausible that people 
 
audience for the original, even if he is not criticizing it, the trademark holder may fear a 
negative effect on his revenues. This has happened when homosexual groups have tried to use 
popular trademarks (such as ‘Pink Panther’) to identify themselves.” LANDES & POSNER, supra 
note 3, at 160–61. It is not clear whether “this has happened” refers to use that might be 
potentially offensive to the audience for the original, to the trademark owner’s fear that his 
revenues might be harmed, or to actual negative effect on the revenues. Unfortunately, the 
reference they cite does not appear to clarify this point. Needless to say, fear that tarnishment 
might happen is not evidence that it actually does or will.  
 131. MGM-Pathe Commc’ns Co. v. Pink Panther Patrol, 774 F. Supp. 869, 877 
(S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
 132. Id. at 871. 
 133. Id. at 875.  
 134. Id. at 877. 
 135. See supra Part VI. 
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holding negative views about some activity with which a trademark 
had been associated would transfer these negative views to the 
original trademark owner and that this process would harm the 
trademark owner. Therefore, I am willing to proceed on the 
assumption that this might happen even in the absence of confusion. 
What is less clear to me is whether this harm to the trademark owner 
also represents social harm and why trademark law should be 
concerned about it. We need to know more about the mechanism 
that is operating.  
Consider the following hypothetical noted by Landes & 
Posner.136 Suppose that gay groups adopt the mark “Pink Panther” 
and that consequently, after using it extensively, the mark is 
understood by the general public to signal gay identity. Plausibly, as 
a result fewer straight people would buy MGM Pink Panther 
merchandise (either because they are homophobic or because they 
are not interested in signaling an identity which is not their own). 
This situation may result even if they know that the trademark 
owner, MGM, does not sponsor or otherwise associate with the gay 
groups. Also suppose that the losses in sales to straights are not 
outweighed by increased sales to gays. How can dilution theory 
explain what has happened? One explanation could be an increased 
imagination cost. Non-gay consumers interested in buying the 
“original” merchandise cannot help but think about gays. No matter 
how hard they try viewing the merchandise in its original meaning, 
they cannot revert to that meaning. This situation might be 
analogous to the Tiffany highway billboard discussed earlier.137 In 
that example, returning to the highway looking for Tiffany-the-
jeweler was prohibitively costly. In this example, mentally returning 
to the original meaning of the mark becomes impossible. So perhaps 
this situation is a variant of the search-cost story underlying the 
concept of blurring, as Posner initially indicated in Ty Inc.,138 or it 
could be a trust-related problem as previously discussed. 
But perhaps a better and simpler explanation is not one of 
increased search cost but rather that the trademark’s cultural or 
social meaning has transformed; it no longer stands for what it 
originally did. Conceptually, this process is similar to genericide, in 
 
 136. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 3, at 160–61. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 511 (7th Cir. 2002). 
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which trademarks lose their significance as source identifiers and 
become the common names of the goods themselves. 
Understandably, this process can be quite disturbing for trademark 
owners, but as Posner indicated in Ty v. Perryman, although 
genericide entails a social cost when the trademark owner has to 
invest in a new trademark to identify his goods (and by implication 
when consumers can no longer rely on the trademark as an 
unequivocal source identifier), the process is socially beneficial 
because it enriches language.139 Similar enrichment of language and 
culture may result when the meaning of marks transform. Posner 
asserts that interpreting antidilution law in a way that prevents the 
evolution of language through genericide may not be in the public 
interest.140 I agree. But his position applies more broadly. We should 
worry about interpreting antidilution laws in a way that prevents the 
evolution of culture and meaning as well.141  
Arguably, until this transformative process is completed, co-
existing meanings could result in higher consumer search costs. 
However, I believe that context, as discussed earlier, eliminates most 
of these costs. Pink Panther merchandise sold in an MGM store142 
would be immediately identified with its original meaning, whereas 
Pink Panther merchandise sold in a gay specialty store would signal 
its newly acquired meaning. Even if context does not eliminate the 
search costs, social benefit clearly arises from cultural 
transformations, so the situation is not necessarily one of net increase 
in social cost. Therefore, the normative basis for rules against 
tarnishment is not as strong as the basis for rules against confusion. 
 
 139. Id. at 514. 
 140. Id. 
 141. See also Katya Assaf, Protection of Trade Marks Against Dilution: A Semiotic 
Perspective, 4 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 643, 649–50 (2009) (criticizing the asymmetry 
that exists where trademark owners are allowed to use cultural signs as trademarks, thus 
modifying their cultural meaning, but the transformation of meaning in reverse may be illegal). 
The danger of cultural stagnation resulting from overbroad trademark rules has been noted by 
others, see, e.g., ROSEMARY J. COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES: 
AUTHORSHIP, APPROPRIATION, AND THE LAW 52–55 (1998); Keith Aoki, How the World 
Dreams Itself To Be American: Reflections on the Relationship Between the Expanding Scope of 
Trademark Protection and Free Speech Norms, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 523, 544–47 (1997).  
 142. See MGM STUDIOS, http://www.webcitation.org/5XB8PyG1N (last visited Jan. 7, 
2011). 
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Deere & Co. v. MTD Products Inc.143 is another interesting 
dilution case, which, at first glance, may be seen as protecting the 
impugned trademark’s trust function. In Deere, the Second Circuit 
ruled that the use of an animated version of John Deere’s trademark 
to promote MTD, Deer’s competitor, was likely to violate New 
York’s antidilution statute.144 In this case MTD produced a TV 
commercial comparing John Deere’s line of lawn tractors to MTD’s 
“Yard-Man” tractor.145 The commercial’s purpose was “to identify 
Deere as the market leader and convey the message that Yard-Man 
was of comparable quality but less costly than a Deere lawn 
tractor.”146 In departure from trademark law’s longstanding favorable 
stance towards comparative advertising, the court found that MTD’s 
use of the mark was likely dilutive and affirmed the issuance of a 
preliminary injunction against MTD.147 The court classified the case 
as a dilution case even though it did not fall into the established 
categories of blurring and tarnishment.148 The court did not find the 
mere use of Deere’s trademark to be dilutive, but rather the fact that 
MTD had altered the trademark and the message it originally 
conveyed.149 The court reasoned: 
The commercial takes a static image of a graceful, full-size deer—
symbolizing Deere’s substance and strength—and portrays, in an 
animated version, a deer that appears smaller than a small dog and 
scampers away from the dog and a lawn tractor, looking over its 
shoulder in apparent fear. Alterations of that sort, accomplished for 
the sole purpose of promoting a competing product, are properly 
found to be within New York’s concept of dilution because they 
risk the possibility that consumers will come to attribute 
unfavorable characteristics to a mark and ultimately associate the 
mark with inferior goods and services.150 
Interestingly, the court did not classify this case as one of 
tarnishment, reasoning that tarnishment is “usually found where a 
 
 143. 41 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 144. Id. at 42, 45–46. 
 145. Id. at 41. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 42, 46–47. 
 148.  Id. at 46. 
 149. Id. at 43–44. 
 150. Id. at 45.  
DO NOT DELETE  3/8/2011 4:57 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2010 
1604 
distinctive mark is depicted in a context of sexual activity, obscenity, 
or illegal activity,”151 although the logic of tarnishment is the same 
logic of this case. More interestingly, however, the court did not 
perceive the case as one of blurring, because the commercial clearly 
preserved the distinction of Deere’s logo and its ability to 
unequivocally symbolize the product’s origin.152 In the court’s mind 
(but in my language) the problem was not that the alteration of the 
mark by MTD impaired its linguistic function, but rather it impaired 
the trust function. MTD’s commercial did not alter who the mark 
represented but what the mark stood for.  
What was lacking from the court’s analysis, however, was an 
articulation of the exact mechanism by which consumers will come 
to attribute unfavorable characteristics to a mark and ultimately 
associate the mark with inferior goods and services. The court also 
failed to identify the nature of this consumer change of mind and the 
wrongdoing in effecting it. The answers to these unasked questions 
largely depend on the exact message conveyed to consumers in this 
commercial. One possibility is that the commercial was a subtle 
animated version of defamatory content: a commercial that 
disparages Deere’s reputation through false suggestions or 
insinuation that John Deere’s lawn tractors are weak and fragile. But 
it is also quite possible that the commercial was an animated 
equivalent of what would otherwise be an acceptable form of 
comparative advertising. Clearly, if MTD explicitly claimed, “You 
may have always thought that John Deere’s lawn tractors are the 
strongest, sturdiest and most reliable lawn tractors on the market, 
but actually MTD’s tractors are stronger, sturdier, more reliable and 
cost less,” making this statement would be a legitimate form of 
comparative advertising provided that these statements were not 
false. While these kinds of statements may diminish the John Deere 
trademark’s favorable image and selling power, they do not—if not 
false—impair its trust function. The statements only calibrate what 
the mark stands for with what it actually is. Preserving the trust 
function of the trademark does not require protecting false beliefs 
about what it stands for. Therefore, while the court seems to have 
been concerned about an issue that looks like an impairment of the 
 
 151. Id. at 44.  
 152. Id. at 43–44. 
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trust function, I am not convinced that MTD’s actions could do 
that, unless its message was false.153  
In any event, whether anti-tarnishment rules target the trust 
function exclusively, or whether tarnishment also involves some 
linguistic search-cost reducing aspects, the theoretical and empirical 
underpinning of such rules remains quite weak. While it is not 
implausible that anti-tarnishment rules prevent the lemonization of 
markets, the likelihood that they actually function in this way is 
much less apparent than in the case of the prohibition against 
confusion.  
B. Other Trust-Promoting Rules 
Nevertheless, trademark law contains other rules that serve the 
trust function exclusively. In other words, they target and protect 
against activity that impairs the trust function, even though the 
activity has no effect on the linguistic function. In a recent paper, 
and based on grounds similar to those presented here, Shahar 
Dillbary explains the law’s attitude towards deceptive and deceptively 
misdescriptive marks.154 Section 1052(a) of the Lanham Act 
prohibits the registration of a deceptive mark, whereas § 1052(e) 
prohibits the registration of a deceptively misdescriptive mark, unless 
the deceptively misdescriptive mark, by virtue of § 1052(f), has 
acquired secondary meaning.155 A mark is deceptively misdescriptive 
if it misrepresents any fact concerning the goods or services and 
consumers are likely to believe the misdescription.156 A mark will be 
considered deceptive “where the mark will bestow upon the product 
an appearance of greater quality or salability than it has in fact,”157 
and if the misrepresentation will “materially affect the decision to 
 
 153. Interestingly, and for what it is worth, the court noted that “MTD submitted the 
commercial to ABC, NBC, and CBS for clearance prior to airing, together with substantiation 
of the various claims made regarding [its] quality and cost relative to the corresponding Deere 
model. Each network ultimately approved the commercial though ABC reserved the right to 
re-evaluate it . . . and CBS demanded and received a letter of indemnity from [the advertising 
company].” Id. at 41. 
 154. Dillbary, supra note 24, at 996–97. 
 155. Lanham (Trademark) Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (2006). 
 156. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 2 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 11:55 (4th ed. 2010). 
 157. Id. 
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purchase the goods.”158 The reason deceptive and deceptively 
misdescriptive marks cannot be registered is not that adopting such 
marks will increase consumer search costs. A mark can fulfill the 
linguistic function as an indicator of source while misrepresenting 
the attributes of the product it is used for. The question “what is the 
source of this product” is not affected by this kind of 
misrepresentation. The misrepresentation only applies to the 
question of “what the mark stands for.”  
As Dillbary explains, unlike misrepresentation, which applies to 
search or experience attributes of the product and therefore can be 
detected by the consumer, misrepresentation about credence 
qualities will be difficult to detect.159 He therefore suggests that the 
law should provide a remedy in situations where the manufacturer 
keeps selling a product under a trademark associated with certain 
material credence attributes of the product, while degrading the 
product’s quality.160 Consumers who used to purchase the product 
relying on the trademark as a signal of such credence attributes are 
damaged when they continue to purchase it without being notified 
that the quality had been degraded.161 In the same vein, McCarthy 
suggests that “a substantial change in the nature or quality of the 
goods sold under a mark may so change the nature of the thing 
symbolized that the mark becomes fraudulent and/or that the 
original rights are abandoned.”162 
The cases of deceptive or deceptively misdescriptive marks and of 
undisclosed degradation of products’ quality are examples of conduct 
that clearly impairs the trust function of trademarks. Therefore, there 
seems to be a strong normative basis for condemning such conduct. 
The problem, however, is that the remedies available under 
trademark law do not always befit the problem. The non-
 
 158. Id. § 11:58 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1052). 
 159. Dillbary, Getting the Word Out, supra note 24, at 1026. 
 160. Id. at 1026–27. 
 161. Id.  
 162. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 3 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 17:24 (4th ed. 2010) (citing Indep. Baking Powder Co. v. Boorman, 175 F. 
448 (C.C.D.N.J. 1910) (where a manufacturer of Solar alum baking powder assigned rights to 
another who substituted phosphate for alum. As a result, the trademark rights were 
forfeited.)); see also Heintzman v. 751056 Ontario Ltd. [1990] 34 C.P.R. (3d) 1 (F.C.T.D.) 
(the trademark “Heintzman” was expunged from the registry after the mark ceased to be used 
for pianos made in Ontario and was affixed to pianos that were outsourced from the United 
States and South Korea, without notifying the public about the change).  
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registrability of deceptive or deceptively misdescriptive marks may 
discourage firms from using them, but trademark law does not 
prohibit their use. A firm may use the mark even if it cannot be 
registered.163 True, when registered, the risk of losing its rights over 
a trademark may discourage a firm from severely degrading its 
quality. However, these incentives are indirect and, in fact, may lead 
to paradoxical results when the absence of trademark rights allows 
other firms to engage in the same misleading activity. Moreover, 
when only one firm uses the mark, the firm will internalize the full 
impact of consumer backlash if and when the truth about its product 
is ultimately discovered. But if all the competitors use the same 
misleading terminology, the risk of consumer backlash spreads across 
all of them and is less likely to police any of them.  
A question that may be asked is why firms would not seek to 
reveal the misrepresentations made by their competitors and gain the 
competitor’s business as a result. The answer is that sometimes they 
will, but not always. In the case of credence qualities, a competitor 
may realize that participating in the misrepresentation might be 
more profitable than providing a superior product, and if the 
misrepresentation can go undetected for a long time, the competitor 
may choose to participate rather than blow the whistle.164 In any 
event, while misrepresentation of one’s own product impairs trust in 
the marketplace and thus provides normative grounds for legal 
action against it, trademark law may not be the most suitable vehicle 
to address these issues. Contract law, tort law, and consumer 
protection laws, along with sector specific regulations in appropriate 
cases, probably provide better tools to address these problems.  
VIII. CONCLUSION 
This Article distinguished between two related but distinct 
functions that trademarks fulfill and trademark law protects. Both 
functions smooth the operation of markets by enhancing and 
preserving the integrity of information signals available to market 
participants. Trademarks’ linguistic function allows consumers to 
reduce search costs because the trademarks provide a simple method 
 
 163. And in the case of a deceptively misdescriptive mark, a firm may use it and eventually 
register it if it acquires a secondary meaning. 
 164. Katz, supra note 17, at 24. 
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to convey complicated meanings about the products’ sources and 
their unobservable attributes. Trademarks’ trust function allows 
consumer to be confident that the claims made by sellers are 
authentic, thereby preventing the lemonization of markets. This 
Article suggested that recognizing the dual functions of trademarks 
provides a matrix for evaluating the normative strength of various 
trademark rules and doctrines. More specifically, rules that promote 
both functions are normatively strong; rules that do not promote 
them are normatively weak; and rules that promote one function but 
not the other are normatively ambiguous, requiring a closer cost-
benefit analysis.  
This Article showed that the prohibition against passing off, the 
classic and most ancient form of trademark infringement, promotes 
both functions, whereas rules that prohibit certain forms of truthful 
and non-confusing comparative advertising do not promote these 
functions and in fact interfere with trademark law’s overall goal of 
increasing the amount and accuracy of information available to 
consumers. This Article also showed that dilution by blurring and 
initial interest confusion may, in some limited circumstances, impair 
the linguistic function but not the trust function; consequently, the 
normative basis for prohibiting these actions is limited. This Article 
further showed that tarnishment does not impair the linguistic 
function and that while tarnishment could be seen as an act 
impairing the trust function, the theoretical and empirical evidence 
for this view is rather limited. Lastly, this Article discussed the 
misrepresentation of one’s own products and showed that despite 
the fact that such behavior does impair the trust function, it does not 
impair the linguistic function; while there are solid grounds for rules 
against such behavior, trademark law is often ill-suited to provide 
appropriate remedies, and the behavior is likely to be better 
regulated through other means.  
 
